contents

ume 78, No. 4, April 1978

EWSLINE

LABOUR LEGISLATION
- Quebec's Bill 45

PRODUCTIVITY
- Increase highest since 1972
- Technology vs. people

HEALTH AND SAFETY
- U.S. survey on worker exposure to hazardous substances
- New approach to accident prevention
- International Harvester builds enviable record

116 EMPLOYMENT
- Work-sharing agreement

116 UNIONS
- Quebec federations propose merger
- FLIP
- Labour brief to Martin Commission

116 CONCILIATION
- Value of compulsion questioned

117 BUSINESS
- Directorship profile

117 ABSENTEEISM
- Twenty-one days off

117 QUALITY OF WORKING LIFE
- Profits up, absenteeism down

118 EDUCATION
- Preparing school leavers for world of work

118 PEOPLE
- Levinson on Du Pont board

118 PERSONNEL
- Management time
- Temperament factor

EATURES

9 **Occupational health and safety: a critical view** by Lynda Leonard

3 **Occupational health and safety: the importance of worker participation** by Joan Brown

9 **A unionist's thoughts on national unity** by Ed Finn

3 **Industrial democracy in Europe and its relevance for Canada: a critical review** by Robert J. Davies

9 **Humanization of work: a European perspective**

3 **The future of collective bargaining in the federal public service** by Roy LaBerge

6 **Industry and expedited arbitration: alternatives to traditional methods** by A.C. Sinclair

2 **Labour legislation in Canada, 1977 — Part 1B: labour relations — public sector** by Nicole Marchand

EPARTMENTS

4 BOOKS

6 ADDITIONS TO THE LIBRARY

3 PRICES, EMPLOYMENT, AND EARNINGS

1 LABOUR STATISTICS

newsline

LABOUR LEGISLATION

Quebec's Bill 45

The Quebec National Assembly has passed controversial amendments to the provincial labour code that will forbid employers from hiring new employees in order to break a strike.

Bill 45 — an Act to amend the Labour Code and the Labour and Manpower Department Act — was finally passed in December, 1977, after several amendments. Most of its provisions don't go into effect until June, 1978, however.

One amendment to the original bill will permit an employer to take "any necessary means" to prevent "serious destruction of moveable or immoveable property" during a strike or lockout. However, even this provision will not permit an employer to hire new workers in order to continue production or services.

Labour Minister Pierre-Marc Johnson said a labour department investigator would assess each individual situation of threatened harm to property. For example, he said, if the workers who operate the heating system of a large office building struck during a cold spell, a shutdown of the system could cause permanent damage and the employer should be allowed to prevent that from happening.

Le Conseil du Patronat du Québec, which represents firms employing 80 per cent of the provincial labour force, criticized the bill for disrupting "the traditional balance of our labour relations for the sole benefit of the unions, without in any way guaranteeing a better future for industrial relations." The Council called the bill as grave an "error" as the 1964 legislation that granted the right to strike in the public service "without providing for regulations capable of protecting the common good."

The Confederation of National Trade Unions deplored that the legislation "enables the government to interfere in unions' affairs." And the Quebec Federation of Labour complained that it does not apply to the construction industry, which is governed by a separate Act.

PRODUCTIVITY

Increase highest since 1972

Productivity — output per worker — rose by 3.6 per cent in 1976, the largest increase for any year since 1972, Statistics Canada reports. However, this is still slightly below the average annual increase of 3.8 per cent over the 15-year period from 1961 to 1976, although productivity increased only fractionally in 1974 and 1975.

Goods-producing industries showed productivity increases of 3.8 per cent in 1976, while service industries had increases of 3.3 per cent.

Increase in output per worker was 4.0 per cent in the United States in 1976, higher than the Canadian percentage, but Statistics Canada warns that care should be used in comparing the figures.

Technology vs. people

A new concept, "industrialization of the services," has been drawing increasing attention in the United States, largely because an increasing proportion of the labour force is employed in labour-intensive service activities such as travel, education, entertainment, eating out and health care. Theodore Levitt, a professor of business administration at the Harvard School of Business, says management in manufacturing has been much more productive than management in service industries because it has thought "technocratically and managerially" about its function. On the other hand, he contends, service management has thought "humanistically."

"As long as we view services as invariably personal — as something performed entirely by personal effort for the direct benefit of other individuals — it prevents us from seeking alternatives to the use of people," Levitt says. This, in turn, inhibits the redesigning of service activities to reduce the labour force.

Levitt asserts service can be

ıstrialized by "hard, soft or rid" technologies. Hard tech-ɔgies substitute machinery, s or other technology for ɔur-intensive functions. An mple is the electrocardiagram ch enables a technician to do k formerly done by a higher d medical doctor listening with ethoscope. Soft technologies stitute "organized and pre-nned systems" for individual vices and may also involve cial hardware. Examples are ermarkets, cafeterias, taurant salad bars, open tool ms in factories and open-stack aries that enable people to ve themselves quickly and ciently instead of being served employees. Hybrid technologies nbine hard equipment with efully planned industrial stems to bring efficiency and er to a service industry. An mple is computer-based truck ting, using careful program-ng for types and grades of ds, location of stops, ngestion, toll costs and other tors to optimize the utilization trucks and minimize costs.

vitt says the industrialization of rvice requires the same ciplines and strategies that ve made modern manufacturing efficient: "It can require as ch costly investment in plant, d, equipment and promotion as s been historically associated h efficiency in manufacturing. It n also require as much planning, ganization, training, control, and nagement as a fundamental nufacturing process."

EALTH AND SAFETY

S. survey on worker exposure hazardous substances

ne in four workers in the United States is exposed to some hazardous substance at the workplace, according to a survey by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. The findings are based on inspections of 4,636 plants employing 985,000 workers in 67 metropolitan areas in the 1972-74 period.

The survey estimates that 1 per cent of the U.S. workforce — or about 880,000 persons — may have been exposed to the 17 carcinogens that now are regulated by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration. However, scientists estimate that an additional 1,500 substances and occupational hazards may also be cancer-causing.

The survey also found that a large proportion of workers who have had contact with potentially hazardous substances have not received medical tests. For example, more than three quarters of all employees exposed to benzine and asbestos had not been tested to determine whether their health had been affected.

In a separate policy paper, the Institute says it could cost up to $2 billion a year to monitor work health hazards and provide medical tests. It also says $3 billion to $5 billion is now spent for all types of cancer treatment, while lost earnings and productivity due to cancer reach $12 billion a year.

New approach to accident prevention

Gulf Oil Canada Limited is adopting a "loss management" concept to replace more traditional safety programing with its focus on preventing personal injury. Robert Wright, Gulf's loss management adviser, says the new concept aims at preserving all the human and material resources of the business, by adopting a systems approach. The key to solving and preventing loss accidents is to identify and remedy the underlying cause — or systems breakdown — he says. "A faulty administrative process allows 'unsafe acts' and 'unsafe conditions' to exist," he says. These arise from failure to set or meet standards in maintenance, operations, training, security, legal or medical matters. And he maintains these are all matters for which management is responsible. "Generally speaking," he says, employees are operating within the framework of the system as they find it in their occupation while they perform their daily tasks. In this sense they are prisoners of the system."

International Harvester builds enviable record

The huge International Harvester farm tractor and engine plant in Melrose Park, Illinois, which employs 4,200 people, has an enviable safety record. In the past nine years there has not been a single fatal accident, and by September 1977 it had built up 1,500,000 continuous hours of work without a disabling accident — one in which the employee missed the next scheduled work day.

The plant's health and safety program includes a hazardous-substances committee, which has tested 1,000 substances brought into the plant, including the soap in the washrooms. The committee insisted on finding safer substitutes for eight of them.

The plant has 55 acres of floor space under one roof and includes five assembly lines, two producing 265 engines in an eight-hour shift and the other three producing

tractors. Signs throughout the plant urge employees to work safely, and extra ventilation has been installed in several areas.

EMPLOYMENT

Work-sharing agreement

The federal government has approved a union-management proposal for a work-sharing agreement at the Brunswick Mining and Smelting Corporation in Bathurst, N.B. The agreement would cover about 600 of the company's 1,600 employees, involving a phased reduction of about 60 workers a month over five months. The Canada Employment and Immigration Commission is to offer these workers a placement program and assistance with moving expenses.

The workforce reduction at Brunswick is a long-term one.

While the government says it is prepared to accept work-sharing proposals in temporary situations, no further agreements similar to that at Brunswick will be made until its effectiveness has been studied thoroughly.

FLIP

Fifteen government departments are participating in the $150 million Federal Labour Intensive Projects (FLIP) program which will generate 157,000 man-months of employment before it ends on Sept. 30. About $30 million of the funds will be contracted out to the private sector. Department proposals, to qualify for FLIP assistance, must have a high labour content, be in areas of high unemployment and have a direct relation to the programs of the departments. The program was originally announced by Finance Minister Jean Chrétien in his Oct. 20, 1977 economic and fiscal statement.

UNIONS

Quebec federations propose merger

Two of Quebec's major labour federations are seeking their members' opinion on a proposed merger — the 160,000-member Confederation of National Trade Unions and the 80,000-member Quebec Teachers' Federation. The merger option most favoured by the leadership of the federations is for a new federation that would include the CNTU, the Teachers' Federation and any other labour body that might join later. If the two bodies merged, the combined membership would still be smaller than that of the 280,000-member Quebec Federation of Labour.

Labour brief to Martin Commission

The government must negotiate on an equal basis with its employees, as any ordinary employer would, but without benefiting from special laws and legal remedies. This is what emerges from a brief submitted by Quebec's three central labour bodies, CNTU, CEQ and QFL, before the Martin Commission, entrusted with reviewing the bargaining mechanisms in the public and parapublic sectors.

In their argument to ensure the free regrouping of unions, the right to strike, and to free bargaining, the centrals objected to the requests of various professional associations from the health and education sectors for a return to "local bargaining." Furthermore the three organizations asked that everything be negotiable, that no measure exclude certain aspects from the scope of bargaining, and that any measure which may be harmful to their voluntary regrouping be repealed. As far as essential services are concerned, union members say they are ready to ensure them themselves and emphasize the "arbitrary" aspect which is the cause for the failure of existing formulae.

The three groups suggest that the government subject the public sector to the Labour Code, thereby avoiding the establishment of a particular labour relations system for government employees.

CONCILIATION

Value of compulsion questioned

An analysis of recent major collective bargaining settlements in Canada supports the argument that compulsory conciliation tends to delay serious bargaining and casts some doubt on the former's effectiveness in reducing work stoppages.

The analysis, published in the September 1977 issue of *I.R. Research Reports,* compares data from Manitoba and Saskatchewan, where conciliation is not compulsory, with those from the other Canadian jurisdictions where it is, over a three-year period ended May 1977.

In jurisdictions where conciliation is compulsory, only 42.6 per cent of the major settlements during the period analyzed were reached at the bargaining stage — ranging from a low of about 30 per cent in primary industries (mining, forestry and fishing) to 51.5 per cent in

rsonal services (mainly educa-
n and hospitals) and 57.7 per
nt in public administration. But
Saskatchewan and Manitoba
mbined, 66.3 per cent of major
ttlements were reached by the
rties themselves at the bar-
ining stage. (The Manitoba and
skatchewan data exclude agree-
ents between teachers and
hool boards.) The proportion of
ttlements reached following a
rk stoppage was also lower in
ose two provinces than in the
her jurisdictions.

Compulsory conciliation, it
pears, results in a tendency to
stpone serious negotiations
til the right to strike or lock out
n be exercised," the analysis
port observes. "Voluntary
nciliation (or mediation),
ailable as the only alternative to
work stoppage, appears to show
ore positive results, improving
e effectiveness of initial
argaining and increasing the
obability that third-party
ssistance will be successful."

USINESS

irectorship profile

he typical Canadian board of
irectors has 11 or 12 members, all
f them male. It meets five or six
mes a year, is dominated by
utside directors, and is made up
ostly of Canadian citizens, as
equired by the Canadian Business
orporations Act, 1975.

hese are some of the findings of
survey of 276 firms — 133 of
hem in manufacturing — by the
onference Board in Canada,
ublished under the title *Canadian
irectorship Practices: A Profile.*
bout 38 per cent of the
espondents were categorized as
small" firms with assets of up to $99 million, 36 per cent as medium firms with assets between $100 to $499 million, and 27 per cent as large firms with assets of $500 million or more.

There were only 32 women among the total of 3,365 directors — a representation of 0.95 per cent. In manufacturing the percentage of women directors was 0.22 per cent and in non-manufacturing it was 1.45 per cent.

Law was the most frequently reported primary occupation of outside directors. About 71 per cent of the companies reported at least one lawyer on the board and, globally among reporting companies, there was one lawyer for every seven outside directors.

Boards of larger companies tend to meet more frequently — a median of six times a year. The median for smaller firms was four times a year and for medium firms five times. The number of meetings held annually ranged from a low of one to a high of 24.

The survey found that most boards also have a compulsory retirement age for their members — 70 per cent in manufacturing and 81 per cent in non-manufacturing. Other reasons cited for retirement or resignation by most companies were "bankruptcy, mental illness or ceasing to be a shareholder." Median retirement age for outside directors was 70 in manufacturing and 71 in non-manufacturing.

ABSENTEEISM

Twenty-one days off

A government study finds that the average French worker is off the job 21 days a year — excluding holidays and strikes. That is about five times the United States average. The study, based on 1975 data, says absenteeism has cost the French economy a total of 381 million man-days — more than 100 times the loss to strikes. The report also notes that 50 per cent of employees were never absent and that 10 per cent of workers accounted for 36 per cent of all days lost. Sickness was the major reason for absenteeism, accounting for 78 per cent of cases.

To combat the problem, the report recommends the hiring of more social security inspectors, the use of computerized files to check on persistent absentees, and the ending of an arrangement that permits workers who are officially off sick to be absent from their homes between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. The report says only 40 per cent of "sick" employees were at home when a social security inspector called.

QUALITY OF WORKING LIFE

Profits up, absenteeism down

A work enrichment program is a major factor in the productivity of Butler Manufacturing Company's 14-month old grain dryer assembly plant in Story City, Iowa. Larry Hayes, the plant manager, estimates that the plant may be 10 per cent higher in profitability than comparable operations with 10 years experience or more. He gives the use of self-managed work teams much of the credit for the plant's average absenteeism rate of only 1.2 per cent compared with the traditional 4 to 5 per cent in United States factories, as well as for its 10-12 per cent annual workforce turnover, compared with an average 35.4 per cent for all U.S. production workers in 1976.

EDUCATION

Preparing school leavers for world of work

About 210 students from high schools in Hartford, Conn., are participating in a workplace program designed to teach them both academic subjects and job skills and provide them with actual work experience. Employers in four industries are co-operating in the program — insurance and banking, electromechanical, health care, and auto repair.

For half of each weekday, the students attend classes in one of four career centres that opened last September, one for each industry. For the other half of the day, they work for one of the sponsoring companies at wages ranging from $2.30 to $3.64 an hour. Much of the curriculum at the career centres is considered more advanced than that of Hartford high schools. For example, the health care centre offers its 50 students courses in biology, physiology, anatomy and chemistry as well as teaching them health care skills. And in January, several of them started a pre-medical program that may help them if they later apply for entry to medical school.

The program is intended to go some way toward meeting the criticisms of some Hartford employers who have complained in the past that high school graduates were unable to perform simple clerical and technical jobs. Dr. Edythe P. Gaines, Hartford's superintendent of schools, says the workplace program is based on the concept that "to prepare youngsters for the world of work, the comprehensive high school must give way to the comprehensive education, brokered by the high school."

PEOPLE

Levinson on Du Pont board

Charles Levinson, a Canadian, has been elected as a worker representative on the supervisory board of Du Pont Deutschland under the new West German legislation that requires companies with more than 2,000 employees to have 50 per cent of their board membership made up of employee representatives.

Levinson, secretary-general of the Geneva-based International Federation of Chemical, Energy and General Workers Unions (ICEF), was nominated by the IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik, the union that represents most workers in the West German chemical industry. He has been a long-time advocate of industrial democracy and a severe critic of some of the practices of multinational corporations. The ICEF has been engaged in developing forms of international trade union action aimed at multinations. Du Pont, with headquarters in Wilmington, Delaware, is one of the world's largest multinationals, with an annual turnover approaching $10 billion.

Levinson, a former writer with *The Labour Gazette*, is the author of several books, including *Capital, Inflation and the Multinationals* and *International Trade Unionism.* His most recent book, *Vodka-Cola* documents the relations of multinationals with Eastern European countries.

PERSONNEL

Management time

A study by Information Science of Montvale, N.J., shows that personnel or "human resources" matters now occupy 20 per cent of management's time and indicates that this percentage may reach 30 in another five years. One reason is the need to control personnel costs while still emphasizing employee satisfaction in a period of high expectations. Modern automated record keeping systems are another factor. Personnel directors need new qualifications and bigger staffs to cope with them.

Temperament factor

Jack McQuaig, an industrial psychologist and consultant, says more consideration should be given to temperament in personnel placement. To put an introverted, creative "specialist" into a management or sales position would lead to great stress as he tried to cope with his new job, McQuaig told a Toronto seminar sponsored by Modern Information Communications Association. Such a person, he said, was unsuited by temperament to motivate or lead staff or to stand firmly by his decisions.

He divided people into categories according to temperament. The "generalist" who is competitive, skilled socially, restless, driving, stubborn and determined, should be in management and sales, but not the "specialist," the "nice guy," or the "autocrat," who are unable to work with people, McQuaig said. He also recommended physical fitness as a help in coping with stress. lg

Occupational health and safety — a critical view

by Lynda Leonard

In response to demands expressed by labour, enlightened management and the public, Labour Canada has proposed the creation of the Canadian Centre for Occupational Safety and Health. In many respects, however, this represents neither an innovative nor a particularly creative approach toward dealing with the growing problem of occupational health hazards.

In 1976, occupational accidents and diseases cost the country close to $800 million in compensation payments, medical costs to workers, and losses in time to industry. Indeed, contrary to a prevailing misconception, strikes and lockouts were not the major time thieves in 1976. Labour problems lost us 11.6 million man days. Work related injuries and accidents took an estimated 13 million.

However, the problem has dimensions far greater than might be suggested by a few figures printed as labour statistics for 1976. The effects of many hazards could not be adequately measured in 1976 or 1977, and won't be measured in 1978. Exposure to a foreign substance like asbestos may not manifest itself as an illness until years later. An ex-miner, for example, might well find his retirement cut short by a malignant cancer spawned in his lungs by asbestos dust inhaled years before in the days when he was working.

There is a serious time lag in identifying work related diseases. Vinyl chloride monomer (VCM), for example, has been used in rapidly growing quantities since it was developed during the Second World War. However, it was not until 1973 that it drew suspicion as a cause of liver cancer and only recently has the substance been definitely confirmed as carcinogenic. New materials are being introduced by industry every year and, while some testing is done to determine their safety, urgent pressures to get the material in production often prevent a thorough and lengthy investigation of a substance. Moreover, it exceeds the limits of human capability to expect that all possible short and long-term effects from a new substance could be controlled for — even in the most conscientious research.

Even when hazards have been effectively identified and workers have been alerted to the risks involved in their jobs, another human dimension enters the problem. Not every worker can choose where he or she will work. In a one-industry town like Thetford Mines or Elliot Lake, for example, the exposure to a hazard leaves the worker with two equally unpleasant options. He can either stay on the job and gamble that his health will hold until he qualifies for a pension, or he can quit and suffer a possibly long but almost certainly impoverished retirement. With unemployment so high — especially in the mining sector — relocation represents a poor third choice. Most will take the first alternative, for occupational diseases are like any other fatal disease; they always happen to somebody else. Moreover, as unemployment steadily grows, those with the jobs are going to hang on to them, regardless of the dangers.

Legislation in the area is an overwhelming jumble of 237 separate federal and provincial acts and more than 400 sets of regulations

However, this is only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the problems surrounding occupational health and safety. There are complications involving the bias of scientific research and data accumulation. Legislation in the area is an overwhelming jumble of 237 separate federal and provincial acts and more than 400 sets of regulations. Most of this is couched in classic legalese incomprehensible to inspectors, health and safety committee members and shop stewards. There are problems involved with insuring both the availability and privacy of medical records. There are problems at every turn. Yet no one attempts to tackle them with any but the old, worn out solutions.

There are several precedents for the creation of a federal research centre for occupational health. In 1970, for example, the United States created the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). In Great Britain, the Health and Safety Commission created through the Health and Safety at Work Act has been in existence for nearly four years. These two centres, and others like them in other countries, are charged with the responsibility for reviewing data, testing new substances, sponsoring research programs and establishing exposure standards. They are obviously early prototypes for the new Canadian centre. But even though it follows as many as eight years later, CCOSH shows no signs of avoiding or correcting the various shortcomings of its forebears. The centre's designers have outlined this preliminary list of functions to be undertaken:

...as unemployment steadily grows, those with the jobs are going to hang on to them, regardless of the dangers

- to provide a forum for achieving consensus among participants for eventual promulgation of consistent standards and codes for occupational safety and health; while respecting existing jurisdictions and practices;

- to serve as a centre for collecting, processing and disseminating scientific and technical information in the field of occupational safety and health to help create greater public awareness of these matters and provide authoritative information for educational purposes;

- to stimulate and orient research interests, needs and activities through the collection of data on the prevailing status and conditions in the workplace in Canada and through dissemination of these data;

- to develop scientific and technical consensus on occupational hazards, review and disseminate documents and model codes on hazard criteria;

- to participate in or operate facilities for testing of industrial processes to simulate or duplicate manufacturing and production processes for the purpose of identifying possible hazards and, if required, establish mechanisms to prevent and/or eliminate these hazards;

...the CLC's Julien Major stated that the Congress would not participate in the centre as proposed....he called it a paper tiger...

- to make available through scientific and technical staffs, advice and service to workers, trade unions, management, government agencies and the public to seek solutions to existing and anticipated problems;

- to undertake and perform pertinent studies and surveys and, through grants, support and coordinate these activities at industrial and institutional levels;

"Caught your arm in the folding machine again, Hurbert?"

) maintain contact,
nmunication and exchange of
rmation with other national and
rnational organizations and
itutions engaged in the
ancement of occupation safety
health standards and systems.

centre will be multipartite in
nposition, governed by approxi-
tely 40 members from federal
provincial government
ncies, the labour movement,
nagement, scientific associa-
s, universities and the public.
mbership breakdown will run
ng the lines of 12 participants
n the provincial governments, 4
n federal departments (Labour
Health and Welfare), five or six
n the labour movement, five or
representing industry, five or
from the scientific/academic
mmunity and two or three from
t portion of the public not
resented by the other groups.
ese members will elect six of
ir number to sit on the centre's
cutive board. Labour and
nagement will both be repre-
nted by at least two members
ch.

e centre will initially cost from
to eight million dollars. It will
staffed by professionals who
l both evaluate and generate
search ideas. Data processing
d record keeping will be an
egral part of the CCOSH
tivities and so a considerable
rtion of the staff will be
mputer personnel. Awards
icers supervising contract
nding will also be required, as
ll as enough administrative and
pport staff as is necessary to
e the institution its federal
vernment identity. CCOSH is to
autonomous from any govern-
nt department and will report
ectly to Parliament through the
nister of Labour. It will have no
thority to publish or enforce
ndatory standards.

...similar centres have been in existence elsewhere for a number of years, and their effects have been less than earthshaking

The Minister of Labour is very optimistic about the potential of the centre. In a speech last fall to the Canadian Engineering Society, he elaborated on his vision of what the centre could accomplish: "Through the provision of expertise, the Centre could assist public authorities in the development of policies and programs for more effective control of occupational hazards. The Centre would also create a new avenue for labour-management participation in the vital pursuit of solutions to these problems." But the multipartite structure does not preclude the kind of suspicion generated when labour and management confront each other from opposite sides of the bargaining table. If anything, it compounds labour's doubts.

"AND ANOTHER THING, BOSWELL... GET YOURSELF A REGULATION HARDHAT"

At the Canadian Labour Congress' Health and Safety Conference held in Toronto last November, CCOSH Director J.H. Currie, tried to sell the centre to the delegates. Few of them bought it, however.

At the close of the CLC conference, the CLC's executive vice-president Julien Major stated that the Congress would not participate in the centre as proposed. He expressed the fear that the multipartite administration would prove too diverse to be functional and that the input of all the other parties would swamp the interests of labour. He called the centre a paper tiger and cautioned against "a false sense of security that something was being done."

Labour is the sector affected by industrial accidents and diseases. Decisions in this area must be labour's

The fact is that similar centres have been in existence elsewhere for a number of years, and their effects have been less than earthshaking. Despite NIOSH, miners in Kentucky still die of black lung. Lead, asbestos, VCM and mercury take their toll every year regardless of the research effort. Just about the only direct and unquestionable benefit that comes from federal research centres is employment for researchers. But even this can become a hazard when dealing with a pressing problem like occupational health. Nicholas Ashford of MIT's Centre for Policy Alternatives pointed out a principle problem with NIOSH that could all too easily become common in other centres of this type: "There are no deliberate attempts to formulate any kind of research policy based on the real problems in the workplace. They don't bring input from labour into the design



"WHY ARE YOU CRYING, SIR?"

of their research projects. What they have is a lot of old time researchers who are accustomed to pursuing their own interests, without regard to the timeliness of their work".

Government researchers, regardless of their commitment, are removed from the problem. When the institution they work for is governed by the patchwork of interests proposed for the Canadian centre, their perception of the urgency of their research is bound to be blurred. Scientists also are removed from the problem. Government administrators are removed from the problem. Management and the general public are removed from the problem. Those directly effected by occupational hazards are those men and women who spend the greater part of their waking day in unsafe workplaces.

Of all parties, labour is in the best position to detect and conscientiously regulate hazardous substances and processes

The central point in this whole issue is one no one wants to approach. Labour is the party affected by industrial accidents and diseases. Decisions in this area must be labour's in counsel with whatever resources it wishes to draw upon. Research centres can be productive. We need the knowledge that such centres can provide, but it is doubtful whether we will get it soon enough from the government centre proposed.

The varied administration of the centre as proposed represents a number of interests not necessarily compatible

It would better serve the purpose to give the $8 million directly to the labour movement for the research priorities it perceives or at least let it draw up the research agenda. The varied administration of the centre as proposed represents a number of interests not necessarily compatible. Governments are interested in protecting their jurisdictions and maintaining political power. Industry is interested in maximizing productivity and profit. Labour is interested in keeping those it represents employed and safely employed. Demands for the abolition of a process or excessively reduced levels of exposure could hurt productivity. But labour has a stake in productivity too. Careless decisions could result in layoffs or lockouts. Of all parties, labour is in the best position to detect and conscientiously regulate hazardous substances and processes. It is possible that this problem may only come to be solved by giving labour more decision-making power, rather than by creating just another government institution. lg

)ccupational health and safety: he importance of worker participation

Joan Brown

Joan C. Brown, a social policy analyst, is the author of Retirement Policies in Canada and A Hit and Miss Affair: Policies for Disabled People in Canada, *published by the Canadian Council on Social Development.*

éviewing the record of safety in nes in Ontario over the last 30 ld years, Ray Stevenson of the nited Steelworkers recalled early tempts (1944) to include health d safety issues in collective greements. The reply at that time as "safety is the sole prerogative management."

nis "sole prerogative" viewpoint ill persists, though it is now ore likely to be expressed as sole responsibility." In evidence efore the Royal Commission on e Health and Safety of Workers Mines (the Ham Report) the lines Accident Prevention ssociation of Ontario (MAPAO) xpressed it thus:

he industry...takes the position uite simply that management is orally, legally and financially sponsible for the occupational afety and health of its employees nd cannot be relieved or excused om this responsibility.

urther, the industry's position is hat this responsibility is one that annot be shared or delegated to a ommittee for this can only result n confused lines of authority and oorer safety.

he moral, legal and financial esponsibility of employers to rovide a safe and healthy work- lace has been recognized by ecent commissions of inquiry into ccupational health and safety, nd is not disputed by the unions. Vhat is in dispute is whether the doctrine" of employer responsi- ility necessarily implies that workers have no right to a say on how that responsibility is carried out.

The union movement has long taken the stand that safety at work is a tripartite responsibility. Joe Morris, writing in *Canadian Labour* in 1964 said:

It is the responsibility of the government to set minimum standards of working conditions; it is the responsibility of management to provide safe and comfortable working conditions; and it is the responsibility of labour to ensure that the conditions it enjoys are safe, and that they are maintained that way.

This notion of tripartite responsibility has been endorsed by the Ham Report, the Alberta Health and Safety Commission, and the Comité d'étude sur la salubrité dans l'industrie de l'amiante.

Labour's part in this shared responsibility can be looked at in at least two ways. First, the knowledge and practical experience of the worker is an essential input in the process of planning and implementing health and safety arrangements and his or her (or the union's) advice must be sought before any decisions are made. The second view assumes the necessity for prior consultation, but goes on to assert that since it is the worker who will suffer by loss of his health or his life if health and safety arrangements fail, he has a right to share in the actual decision-making and implementation process. Merely to be asked for advice, however, which may then be ignored, is not enough. There must be actual power sharing and under highly dangerous conditions, the right of veto.

Safety at work is a tripartite responsibility

Insofar as there has been worker participation in occupational health and safety arrangements, it has, at least until recently, been of the first of these two categories.

Governments planning new legislation or regulations will frequently consult interested parties, including labour organizations, before proceeding. Under our system of government it is recognized that the final decisions on legislation will be taken by government, and power sharing is not expected. However, from the viewpoint of labour, both the consultation process and the outcome often leave a lot to be desired.

As in all government consultations, it can happen that the basic decisions have already been made.

Toronto Star Syndicate

"I wonder if this is covered by my health insurance?"

In this case the consultation will be largely a ritual. It may be a handsome and elaborate ritual, but as a process it is quite meaningless. At other times consultation is undertaken with serious intent, and every effort is made to enable labour organizations to participate. However, where the views of industry and labour are in conflict, the dice are often loaded against labour. Industry is able to bear the cost of the preparation of detailed briefs, it can afford to hire legal, medical and other expertise, and has access to sources of information denied to the workers. Many labour organizations have few staff, limited funds, and because of government's failure to collect and publish adequate data on occupational health and safety, may have a poor information base. Only the larger unions can operate on a reasonably equal basis with industry. Unorganized workers are not even in the race. However, even where labour can and does make an effective input, other factors will often influence the final decisions. Political and economic considerations, not always directly related to the health and safety of workers, may lead government to favour the viewpoint of industry over labour where these are in conflict.

The knowledge and practical experience of the worker is an essential input in the process of planning and implementing health and safety arrangements

---

A second form of participation is worker representation on advisory committees. Part of the self-regulation approach to occupational health and safety in Canada has been the support given by government to employer industrial safety associations. Ontario, for example, has nine such associations funded by the Workmen's Compensation Board. Because of the important and, in some areas, the key role these associations play, the 1967 Royal Commission on Workmen's Compensation recommended labour representation in their activities.

B.J. Legge, discussing this in 1972 (in *The Canadian System of Workmen's Compensation)* said:

The idea of giving an equal voice to labour representatives on boards of directors organized and financially supported by industry has not yet been accepted with great enthusiasm. Progress has been made by the Construction Safety Association and the Industrial Accident Prevention Association which have both set up separate advisory committees to their boards of directors. On the advisory committees labour and management sit as equal partners to discuss the programs and needs of the industry involved. This enables the association to benefit from the ideas and experience of representatives of labour while maintaining the concept that they are fundamentally associations of employers.

In most of the safety associations in Canada the relationship between the association and the workers is one of educator and pupil, whether in crew safety meetings, seminars, or safety courses. Even where the idea of worker representatives is accepted, their role is not expected to be decisive. The Industrial Accident Prevention Association, for example, has a liaison committee, jointly chaired by the IAPA and the Ontario Federation of Labour, whose main function is to plan educational activities. In 1975 MAPAO's annual report stated:

During the year, your Association decided that a Liaison Occupational Safety and Health Committee, composed of MAPAO representatives and representatives from organized labour, could be a valuable adjunct to the industry's overall safety and health effort...

olitical and economic consi-erations...may lead govern-ent to favour the viewpoint of dustry over labour where ese are in conflict

hile the Committee has not been rmed, the Association is hopeful at it soon will be, and that it will erate amid a flexible, informal ructure aimed at providing effec-e dialogue on the various safety d health issues that are of utual concern.

will be noted that the committee as to be an adjunct (albeit a luable one) aimed at promoting alogue. It was not intended to ave any authority.

ne Construction Safety Associa-on of Ontario has gone a little rther. It has labour-management afety committees at provincial nd regional levels. In addition to ducational activities, these ommittees have prepared briefs n construction and crane safety gislation and developed basic andards and safety manuals.

abour is also represented on a umber of provincial government dvisory committees, such as the ntario Labour Safety Council and ne Nova Scotia Workmen's ompensation Board Executive ommittee on Industrial Accident revention. Given that such ommittees often have substantial bour representation (though not ll of them do), this is a useful rm of participation. However, it oes not constitute real power. An dvisory committee, by its very ature, is not intended to do more an *advise*. Someone else, the linister, the department, the oard, will decide on whether or ot that advice is to be taken, and ne decision will not necessarily be based solely on whether the advice was good or bad.

A form of participation closer to the workplace can be found in collective agreements and legislation, providing for company-union safety inspections, or for the right of a worker representative to accompany a government safety inspector on job-site inspections. However the United Steelworkers, in evidence to the Ham Commission, reported mixed experience with company-union arrangements:

Many collective agreements negotiated by the Steelworkers over the years covering Ontario mines have provisions for joint company-union safety tours. These tours should provide the basis of a co-operative safety program in which union and management seek out problems as a team and combine forces to eliminate conditions that could cut short miners' lives. In practice, safety tours are usually considered a nuisance by the company and become a source of frustration to the employees.

Every aspect of the safety tour provides grounds for contention. How often will the tours be held? Who will pay the lost wages involved? What is the guarantee that all areas will be covered? Is the tour intended to penalize individual workers or to point out problems? What if dangerous conditions go for long periods without being rectified?

...The effect of the safety tour is different at every mine, and a major factor is management's attitude.

The usefulness of the legislated right to accompany inspectors is clearly limited by the relative infrequency of such inspections. Hazardous industries may be inspected two or more times a year and the less hazardous industries annually, but many workplaces will receive attention far less often. Further, while in some instances a follow-up on the correction of unsatisfactory conditions will include involvement of the workers' representative or the union, quite frequently the inspector deals solely with management.

Even where the idea of worker representatives is accepted, their role is not expected to be decisive

On a longer term basis, involvement of workers may be achieved through employer-worker joint safety committees. Until 1972 in Saskatchewan, and more recently elsewhere, these committees have been formed either on a voluntary basis or as a result of collective bargaining. They vary greatly in their role and their effectiveness. The Electrical Utilities Safety Association of Ontario, which encourages their development, sees them largely as an educational tool and as "excellent forums for good communication between management, supervisors and tradesmen through which there can be a free flow of information and suggestion in both directions."

Where they have developed as a result of collective bargaining, they are more likely to exercise some direct oversight on safety matters, but the extent of their influence will vary. The United Steelworkers, for example, giving evidence to the Ham Inquiry, reported good, bad and indifferent experience with joint committee arrangements, the outcome depending on such factors as general labour-management relationships, the extent of

management's concern for safety, and the economic position of the company. The Finn Inquiry (into Health and Safety in Grain Elevators) reported:

There appears to be wide variation in the success with which these committees have discharged their functions and in the attitude of management to their operation. The workers of the United Grain Growers elevator, in particular, described the attitude of management to the safety committee in very derogatory terms, stating that the union personnel on the committee were laughed at and their views denigrated...

The manager of the elevator in question denied any knowledge of the existence of such an attitude and stated that if such existed it was not endorsed by him.

Hazardous industries may be inspected two or more times a year...but many workplaces will receive attention far less often

While many of these joint committee arrangements have been useful, the fact remains that as a system for participation it has obvious weaknesses. It operates only in a minority of workplaces, and even in those it will be highly dependent upon the goodwill of management or on the strength of the union. Few, if any, committees have real power, and if they fail to achieve healthy and safe conditions through persuasion, there is little else the committees can do.

Faced with poor health and safety conditions and inadequate participatory arrangements, some unions have turned to collective bargaining as a solution of sorts. Many important safety advances have been achieved through this mechanism, but it too has definite disadvantages.

Only one third of Canadian workers are unionized, and although non-union workers in unionized firms will benefit from the safety provisions of a collective agreement, those in non-unionized companies have no access to this mechanism.

The union movement itself is by no means uniform in its attention to health and safety issues. Frank Chafe of the Canadian Labour Congress, writing in *Canadian Labour* in 1975 said: "In many parts of Canada, the dismal truth is that health and safety activity, if it exists at all, is at the bottom of union priorities." Many of the smaller unions have neither the staff nor the resources to build up expertise in occupational health and safety, and the serious lack of published data further compounds the situation. Larger unions, such as the United Steelworkers, the United Auto Workers, the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, and the United Rubber Workers have acquired substantial expertise and given the issue high priority, but leadership from union headquarters is not enough. Much of

Many of the smaller unions have neither the staff nor the resources to build up expertise in occupational health and safety



" THREE THOUSAND GUYS IN THIS PLANT AND I HAVE TO RUN OVER THE FOOT OF THE SAFETY DIRECTOR!"

e direct action must be taken at e union local level, and the iorities of these locals and the tent of their knowledge of health d safety hazards will again vary.

nder the best of conditions, ccess at the bargaining table on alth and safety issues may well e limited by management resis- nce, by threats of plant closure displacement of workers by tomation, or by the economic ability of the company and its mpetitive position.

owever, the most serious issue relation to the collective rgaining approach is whether alth and safety should be garded as an appropriate issue r bargaining at all rather than the *ght* of every worker. Should alth and safety be traded gainst wage increases, pensions fringe benefits in the context of hat the Ham Report called "the damantly confrontational naracter of Canadian labour- anagement relationships?" Ham nsidered that "questions of alth and safety are not suitable sues for collective bargaining." he United Steelworkers agree: Bargaining involves compromise, nd in the field of health and afety it seems wrong that workers hould be forced to settle for less an the necessary protection."

hanges are taking place in anada. The 1972 and 1977 askatchewan Occupational ealth and Safety Acts, together ith the practice of the Provincial epartment of Labour's Division n Occupational Health and afety, represent serious attempts make worker participation a ality. First, joint employer- mployee occupational health ommittees are mandatory in every lace of employment at which 10 r more persons are employed, nd at least half of the committee embers must be employees not

The most serious issue...is whether health and safety should be regarded as an appropriate issue for bargaining rather than the right of every worker

connected with management. The committees are co-chaired by employer and employee representatives, either of whom may call a meeting. Thus the existence and functioning of the committee does not depend on the goodwill of management or the strength of the workers in negotiation.

Second, the duties of the committee are specified in the legislation. They cannot easily be relegated to the role of mere ritual, nor can their role vary in essentials from company to company.

Third, they have the legislated right to participate "in the identification and control of health and safey in the place of employment." The 1977 Act requires that the employer consult and co-operate with the committee on matters of health and safety at work. The legislation also protects those workers who are on the committee as well as those who complain to it, through fairly tough anti-discrimination clauses that safeguard wages and employment.

As a further support to the committees, the Division provides training programs for committee members designed to overcome inexperience and lack of confidence in their rights and duties and to teach them how to monitor hazards in the workplace.

Fourth, the committees have been built into the inspection and enforcement process. Not only can they complain to the Division about health and safety matters they have been unable to resolve, but when an inspection takes place, the report of the inspector and his notices of contravention of health and safety provisions are provided to the committee. More important, the employer is required to report to the committee within a specified time on the progress made toward remedying the contravention.

The committees report regularly to the Division, usually on specially designed forms on which the minutes of the committee and requests for information and assistance are recorded. Data from these reports have been computerized giving the Division useful information on the functioning of the committees, on unresolved and emerging problems, and on changes to the law or regulations as well as on such changes in the Division's programs as may be required.

In Saskatchewan the right of the worker to refuse to do work which he has reasonable grounds for believing is unusually dangerous to his health and safety has been established

Finally, the right of the worker to refuse to do work which he has reasonable grounds for believing is unusually dangerous to his health and safety has been established with accompanying protection of the worker's job and wages.

This legislation, together with the Saskatchewan division's unashamed bias toward the right of the worker to enjoy safe and healthy working conditions and to have a strong say in controlling those conditions, goes a long way toward overcoming the weaknes-



Toronto Star Syndicate

"The price is high because it has to pay for the research for the drugs to be banned later to replace those banned today."

ses of earlier provisions for worker participation; however, the millenium has not been reached. Moreover, the necessity in 1977 to legislate the duty of employers to consult and co-operate suggests that harmony has not prevailed everywhere. No doubt not all of the committees are as effective as they could be. Workers in very small units are not as well protected as those in larger companies. However, Saskatchewan's leadership in establishing machinery for worker participation has been important, not only to that province but to Canada as a whole.

Four other provinces, Alberta, Manitoba, New Brunswick and Ontario have in 1976 and 1977 legislated for joint health and safety committees. Only in New Brunswick are these mandatory — in employment units of 20 or more workers. Moreover, it is of interest to compare the Ontario Employees Health and Safety Act of 1976 with the Saskatchewan provisions. The Act (a short-term measure passed in December 1976 pending more comprehensive legislation), established two forms of worker participation; joint health and safety committees, and worker health and safety representatives.

As long as the present dearth of information on health and safety persists the exercise of the right to participate will be seriously handicapped

In both cases a Ministerial directive is required to appoint them formally. The committees have power "to identify situations that may be a source of danger or hazard to employees" and a right to obtain information from the employer or others on potential or existing hazards. However, they can only recommend to the employer or employees programs, measures and procedures for health and safety. Also, while the health and safety representatives may inspect the workplace once a month and may accompany departmental inspectors on their visits, they may only recommend improvements and (with the committees and the workers) receive copies of the inspectors' reports. Thus, though the workers' right to refuse dangerous work is established, it is not as well protected as in Saskatchewan.

The element of the actual right of workers to participate is missing from the Ontario legislation. It depends on the exercise of Ministerial discretion. Further, the element of control is missing, and neither the committees nor the health and safety representatives have any part in the enforcement process. It looks uncommonly like the prescription as before — participation without significant power sharing.

As a final note, we return to an issue that arises again and again in the field of health and safety, namely that effective participation depends to a considerable extent on knowledge. As long as the present dearth of information on occupational health and safety persists in Canada, the exercise of the right to participate, even if it is established, will be seriously handicapped. lg

A unionist's thoughts on national unity

Ed Finn

e issue of national unity which s preoccupied most Canadians recent years has also been a bject of much discussion and bate within the labour move- nt. And because the labour ovement is as diversified and fused as the country, with its mbers comprising a cross- ction of the population, it is not rprising that we have within ion ranks the same differences opinion about the future of nfederation that we find among e general public.

e have union supporters of all e options and answers being oposed, from "renewed deralism" to "sovereignty- sociation," although they may just as confused about what ese terms really mean as eryone else seems to be. And ese differing views flow from the me levels of knowledge and norance, of tolerance and ejudice, that characterize anadian society as a whole.

here are, however, some distinc- ve aspects to labour's outlook on tional unity — at least on the rt of union leaders and rank-and- e activists — that are shaped by ndamental trade union beliefs. nd these combine to produce a gnificantly more sympathetic proach to the aspirations of uebec nationalists than would be und among other organizations nd institutions.

ne of the basic rights honoured y organized labour is "freedom of sociation," which in the union ntext means the right of workers join the union of their choice.

Ed Finn, director of publications and information for the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers, writes a regular column on labour for the Toronto Star.

Conversely, it means the right of workers to *leave* a union by majority decision, which under our labour laws takes the form of a decertification vote. The members of a union are spread among several, and often hundreds of, bargaining units, so decertification votes are conducted on the same organizational basis, when a labour relations board is persuaded that secessionist sentiment is sufficient to warrant a plebiscite.

Canada, too, is a union. It would be stretching the analogy to describe the provinces and territories as bargaining units, although their relationship with Ottawa does involve a great deal of bargaining; but there is enough similarity with trade union structure to evoke the same kind of response from union members. It should be noted, too, that the reason workers decide to leave a union is because they are dissatisfied with the standard of service it provides, and sometimes because they feel that its constitution does not give them the same benefits that it confers on other sections of the membership.

...we have within union ranks the same differences of opinion about the future of Confederation that we find among the general public

They come to a conviction that they should transfer to another union, or, not uncommonly, that they would be better off to set themselves up as an independent organization.

I hasten to add that unionists do not like to see this kind of separation. It further divides and fragments an already divided labour movement. They would prefer to see an accommodation made, levels of servicing improved, so that the aggrieved members will decide to stay. But if, despite all such attempts to keep the union intact, a viable group of members insists on splitting away, their right to do so is not seriously challenged. Indeed, there is no way that the results of a decertification or representation vote could be legally defied.

Given this way of resolving "separatist" problems within trade unions, it is not surprising that there should be considerable support among union members — particularly the more active and militant ones — for the right of the people of Quebec to decide their own destiny. The term most often used to define that right is "self-determination." It is not, in my view, an appropriate term for trade unionists to employ, especially when it is left unqualified by geography, size, or numbers. It could be construed to mean that any economic, cultural, social, or localized group should have the right to determine its own political system — or even that each individual should have that right. This is not only a recipe for anarchy, but it runs counter to

another basic union principle — that of unity, solidarity, and collective action.

The right of Quebeckers to "self-determination," however it may be defined, has nevertheless been endorsed at several important union conventions in the past year or so. To some extent this has resulted from pressure generated by these unions' Quebec delegates, but it also reflects a widely held view among English-speaking unionists that, whatever Quebec's future is to be, it has to be decided primarily, if not exclusively, by the people of Quebec themselves. It cannot be imposed on them from outside that province. Even the most ardent federalists among Anglophone labour leaders would regard any use of force to oppose the majority wishes of Quebeckers as abhorrent and unthinkable.

Union federalists are concerned that when the time comes for Quebeckers to choose between Confederation and independence, or (conceivably) something in between, their decision should be made in full knowledge of the facts, and that the pros and cons should first be thoroughly discussed and understood. But they are also convinced that the federalist case has to be argued by Quebeckers, and won or lost by them, not by English Canadians from outside Quebec. Nevertheless, what happens to Quebec will affect all Canadians and we all have a right to get involved in any debate over whether or how the country can be held together.

I am very much aware — as most union members are — that the separatist feeling in Quebec is rooted principally in linguistic and cultural soil, rather than in economics. We hear much about the exploitation of Quebeckers by their Anglophone "overlords," about the lack of opportunity for Francophones in the business world, about the favouritism shown to Ontario over Quebec by the federal government and multinational corporations, about the high rate of unemployment in Quebec as compared with some other provinces.

These are all valid complaints, but not of such overriding intensity that they would fuel a desire to separate from Canada. They all are susceptible to correction within the framework of Confederation, and in fact the present government of Quebec has enacted legislation that will go a long way toward correcting those that are rooted in racial discrimination.

If most French-speaking Quebeckers still hold back from taking the plunge into independence, it is not because they have faith that federalism in any form can accommodate and satisfy them...

But in terms of economic disparity, other regions of Canada, notably the Atlantic provinces and parts of the Prairies, have even more grounds for dissatisfaction than does Quebec. Unemployment and living costs are both higher in the Maritimes and Newfoundland, per capita income is lower, and industrial development harder to achieve. Indeed, when I visited Newfoundland last November, I heard more grumbling about the inequalities that the present form of Confederation imposes on that province than I have heard when visiting Montreal or Quebec City. There are, in short, provinces other than Quebec whose residents very much want reforms that will give them a better deal.

The key word, of course, is "reform." While there are a few vocal separatists in the Atlantic region and the western provinces, they are a small and largely ignored minority. Most Canadians outside Quebec are committed to the Canadian nation, look upon themselves as Canadians first and Nova Scotians, Ontarians and Manitobans second, and are therefore inclined to look for improvements in the federalist system rather than a withdrawal from the system as the answer to their grievances. I am not saying that the majority of Quebeckers would vote today to pull out of Canada. If we are to credit the public opinion polls, the separatist option still commands less than 30 per cent of voting strength within Quebec. But that is not the same as a positive vote for federalism. We Anglophones delude ourselves if we take much comfort from such polls. If a poll were taken of Francophone Quebeckers asking if they believed the Canadian Constitution could be amended in a way that would satisfy all their cultural and linguistic aspirations, as well as their purely economic wants, I very much doubt if the majority result would be affirmative. If most French-speaking Quebeckers still hold back from taking the plunge into independence, it is not because they have faith that federalism in any form can accommodate and satisfy them; it is because they are not yet convinced that the advantages of separation — of being maîtres chez nous — outweigh the disadvantages. But that could change. Those who preach secession or sovereignty, under whatever name, are among the opinion moulders of Quebec society — the teachers, the writers, the journalists, the artists, the students. And they are growing more and more influential.

Whether my assessment is pessimistic or realistic, it stems in part

)m my observation of what has ppened, and is still happening, thin the Canadian labour move- ent, which is (among other ings) a mirror of our society d our federal structure. We have national labour centre, the anadian Labour Congress, which s ten provincial federations, and hundred or more affiliated tional and international unions, ost of which also have members all ten provinces. But the state labour affairs in Quebec differs arply from that in the rest of the untry.

me unions, including my own, ave always recognized the French fact," and have from the eginning provided bilingual rvicing, publications, simul- neous translation at conventions, nd proportionate representation elected offices and full-time taff. Other unions, regrettably, ave been much less conscien- ous in bilingualizing their rvices and procedures, and have ad to be pressured into it by their uebec sections, often by threat f secession.

the long run, however, it doesn't eem to matter whether a union as done all it can to make its uebec members feel at home or ot. If it remains predominantly nglish Canadian or American, it is ot viewed by most Quebec orkers as one they can feel omfortable in — at least, not ithout having much more auton- my than is enjoyed by the union's omponents outside Quebec.

ignificantly, Quebec is the only rovince with its own major labour entre, the Confederation of lational Trade Unions, along with nother central organization that plit off from the CNTU a few ears ago. Even more significant, he Quebec Federation of Labour, he CLC's official Quebec branch, as achieved so much autonomy

...the state of labour affairs in Quebec differs sharply from that in the rest of the country

that its connection with the CLC could be described as a form of "sovereignty-association." It certainly is not a provincial federation "comme les autres" in the CLC family. Unlike the others, it pretty well runs its own programs, adopts its own policies, and treats the CLC as a friendly foreign power rather than as its supervisory body.

Similarly, many of the Quebec branches of national and international unions have wrested a great deal more control from their head offices than have their counterparts in other provinces. It would perhaps be an exaggeration to describe their special status as "self-governing," but it is clear that, in terms of their operations within Quebec and the policies they adopt and follow, they are free to go their own way without serious interference or objection from their top officers outside Quebec. This may not be true of all the unions, particularly the smaller ones or those whose members in Quebec are comparatively small sections of national certifications and agreements. But it is true of a considerable number of the larger labour organizations.

Most disturbing of all is the trend toward splitting unions and national bargaining units along linguistic lines. The Quebec members of the air traffic controllers' and pilots' unions have applied for the right to leave and establish their own unions in Quebec. The CNTU is busy raiding the Quebec members of some components of the Public Service Alliance of Canada, which represents federal civil servants, and is on the verge of applying for certification on their behalf to replace the existing national union.

The French-speaking members of the CBC's production staff, of course, have already succeeded in splitting away from the Canadian Union of Public Employees, after successfully applying to the Canada Labour Relations Board for decertification. The reasons for the

"Miss Smith, take an ultimatum!"

board's decision to split a national bargaining unit into Francophone and Anglophone unions are extremely interesting to study. The main reason was that the CBC itself had already created a separate French-service division, which CBC hostess Barbara Frum correctly described as "a perfect prototype, a working model of a divided Canada." The CLRB, citing this administrative division, reasoned that if Quebec was to have a separate broadcasting service, the Quebec employees of that service might as well have a separate union.

Such a rationale, applied to the broader English-French issue, would lead to de facto independence for Quebec, and this seems to be the direction in which we are heading — the disconnection, link by link, institution by institution, of all the organizational bonds that tie Quebec to the rest of Canada.

It is depressing, too, to read in the CLRB's report of the inability of CUPE's English and French CBC locals to co-exist amicably in the same union. The Montreal local's separatist tactics disrupted the operations of the union's broadcast section to the point of chaos. The Toronto and Ottawa locals were so disgusted with their Montreal confrères that their top officers appeared before the CLRB to support the Quebec local's breakaway bid. The Ottawa local called the Montreal members' obstructive tactics "a disaster for CBC production employees," and an officer of the Toronto local declared that "for the sake of sanity we have no choice but to support the application for separation."

Transmitting this attitude to the national level, we see it manifested by those English Canadians whose reaction to the threat of Quebec's departure is "let them go — and good riddance."

The whole episode is discouraging to those of us who believe in a united labour movement in a united Canada. The labour relations system we have developed is a microcosm of our political and constitutional structures. It is a testing ground for determining whether English and French Canadians can belong to the same organizations and make them work to the satisfaction and benefit of both.

What is happening in the labour relations field...is setting precedents and patterns that weaken our federal system rather than strengthen it

Keep in mind that Quebec's union separatists — like their political counterparts — are not seeking an improved relationship with their parent organizations. They would not be content with better servicing in their own language, or with greater recognition and respect for their cultural dissimilarity. They demand nothing short of full independence.

Quebec as a province and as a distinctive cultural region has solid grounds for wishing to renegotiate its "contract" with the federal government. The Maritimes and the West, economically if not culturally, also can justify their demands for a more equitable federalism. Those of us who are federalists are in favour of making whatever reasonable concessions are required to avoid breaking up the country — concessions to all provinces and regions with legitimate grievances, and special concessions to Quebec to help preserve its language and culture and to enable Quebeckers to feel more at home in all parts of Canada.

What is happening in the labour relations field, however, is setting precedents and patterns that weaken our federal system rather than strengthen it. If, as federalists, we do not regard separatism as a desirable way to satisfy Quebec's cultural aspirations, then to be consistent, if nothing else, we should not consider it a suitable response to the dissatisfaction of Quebec members of national unions and bargaining units. If they have well-founded grievances — and I think many of them have — there are avenues within trade unions, and labour board procedures for correcting them. If these are inadequate, legislation could be passed to compel all unions to recognize and meet the special needs of their Quebec members. It is one thing to agree, as most unionists do, with the principle of "self-determination," for Quebec, but quite another to set examples that would encourage that right to be exercised in a way that would divide the country.

If we are right to argue that, at the political level, English and French Canadians should resolve their differences within Confederation, we should take the same approach to separatism at the union level; but we are not. Even some federal politicians have expressed approval of splitting national bargaining units into French and English Canadian pieces, and proposed changes to the Public Service Staff Relations Act would enable the Quebec sections of pan-Canadian unions to do just that.

The implications of such a split, however, go far beyond the area of labour relations, and threaten more than the unity of the labour movement. For if members of our two founding races cannot live harmoniously in the same unions, we have to wonder how much longer they can co-exist in the same country. lg

ndustrial democracy in Europe and its elevance for Canada: a critical review

y Robert J. Davies

s is well-known, the pressures for ie extension of democratic princi-les to the industrial sphere that merged in Europe after the econd World War resulted in lmost all countries in the creation f *works councils* as the primary nstitutional device for furthering orker participation. In Belgium, rance, the Netherlands and candinavia these took the form of oint labour-management bodies, hile in Austria and Germany they ere composed entirely of worker epresentatives.

espite these differences in omposition however, their urpose was broadly the same, to ct as intermediate bodies etween management and workers t the plant level, with a view to urthering the climate of mutual rust and good will between the wo sides of industry that had merged in response to war-time onditions. Accordingly the works ouncils were charged with three road participatory functions: (1) to romote the exchange of informa-ion between management and orkers *(communication);* (2) to act s advisory bodies to management n a variety of matters *(consulta-ion)*; (3) more recently, to share in ertain management functions *(co-etermination).*

n principle, therefore, the peration of the workers' councils, vith the notable exception of hose in Sweden where they have een primarily advisory, has ffectively spanned much of the pectrum of forms of participation rom communication to co-deter-mination. Given this fact, it has been suggested that the most practical way of ascertaining the *actual* degree of influence exerted by workers on the decision-making process in any given country is to examine the *nature* and *scope* of the decisions that are subject to the various forms of participation, rather than to merely consider the institutional basis of that participation.

As far as European works councils are concerned, the pattern that has emerged in this respect has been a fairly common one. In the sphere of communication, for example, managements have generally been under some obligation to provide councils with relevant information on matters such as productivity performance, the financial and profit position of the firm, and its future prospects; while consultation has tended to be concentrated primarily on matters relating to the overall structure and functions of the enterprise, including its organization, the planning of its production, decisions on relocation or curtailment of operations, and mergers. As far as co-determination is concerned, activity has been largely confined to the areas of welfare policy, training, and safety; although in Germany recent legislation has extended co-determination rights to include the question of layoffs and dismissals.

There has invariably been a gulf between the theoretical and actual functioning of works councils in Europe

Before any firm conclusions are drawn about the effectiveness of the works councils as instruments for promoting participation, however, it is important to emphasize that there has invariably been a gulf between their theoretical and their actual functioning. Indeed, only in Germany and Austria is their performance considered to have been broadly satisfactory. Consequently, in the two and a half decades that have passed since their introduction they have been the subject of significant and on-going reform and amendment, a fact that reflects a common trend of dissatisfaction with many aspects of their performance.

In the late 1960s for example, a variety of important revisions were made to works council legislation in France, Belgium and the Netherlands, while in Denmark and Sweden the same trends were expressed in the renegotiation of works council agreements.

The reasons for this widespread dissatisfaction were broadly similar. In the first place the operation of the councils had come to be left largely to the initiative and discretion of the employers, who in practice seldom saw fit to provide workers' representatives with the information they required to perform effectively. Moreover, consultation all too frequently became a mere formality, with the main function

of the councils being to provide a means through which management could convey unpopular decisions to workers after they had already been made. Perhaps of greatest importance, however, was the fact that the unions increasingly came to view the works councils as a potential means by which management could prevent them from obtaining a significant presence at plant level and thus of frustrating the growth of their power within the enterprise.

Despite these failings, it was generally agreed in all the countries concerned that the works councils were still a basically sound institution.Accordingly, reform was largely directed toward closing the gap that had developed between their theoretical potential as instruments of participation, and their actual performance. In particular, increased stress was placed on the need for management to make available relevant information relating to the financial and economic situation of the enterprise *in advance* of the act of decision making, as well as on defining more clearly the role of the councils, and extending the range of their co-determination functions.

Perhaps of most significance, however, were the attempts that were made to overcome union distrust by actively recruiting the latter's participation in the life of the councils. In Sweden, for example, where the essential role of the unions has always been recognized, and where this role is explicitly acknowledged in the definition of works councils as, "organs for information and consultation between management and the workforce *through their trade union,*" an agreement reached in 1966 vested authority for the establishment of works council election rules with local unions. Moreover, the agreement

In the absence of a viable trade union presence works councils fulfilled the obvious need for some form of worker representation at the enterprise or plant level

also made provision for the chairmen of union locals to become ex officio members of the plant councils, a move calculated to further promote the *formal* integration of these councils with the trade unions. However, even these reforms were not considered sufficient by Swedish unions, and pressure continued for further reform. Indeed, in Europe generally the relationship between the trade unions and the works councils remains one of the central issues of concern.

Pressure for reform to secure the extension of participation has also been evident in the area of boardroom representation. Between 1972 and 1974, for example, legislation introducing minority worker representation at board level was passed in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria; while in Germany, where the principle of boardroom co-determination was originally established in the coal and steel industries in 1952, legislation passed in 1976 extended the right of 'parity' representation to all companies with more than 2,000 employees. In the latter case, however, the inclusion of company executives under the legislation as 'worker' representatives, meant that these reforms fell somewhat short of the full co-determination that had been demanded by German unions.

Despite this continuing trend toward increased worker representation at board level, severe doubts remain about certain aspects of its operation. In particular, widespread concern has been expressed over such issues as the development of role conflict amongst worker representatives who on the one hand are required to take an active part in managerial functions, but who must at the same time seek to maintain effective links, as well as a high degree of credibility, with their constituents. In addition, much controversy has surrounded the role of the trade unions in relation to the operation of a system of boardroom representation, especially with regard to the election of worker representatives; an issue which, incidentally, figured prominently in the discussions which followed the publication of the Bullock committee

Despite the continuing trend toward increased worker representation at board level, severe doubts remain about certain aspects of its operation

report on industrial democracy in Britain. Indeed with regard to the general issue of the effectiveness of worker representation as an instrument of participation, in the sense of promoting genuine co-determination rather than mere consultation, a report prepared for the Bullock committee concluded, on the basis of a survey of the European experience, that, "it would be most unwise to see worker directors as anything more than a marginal contribution to industrial democracy."

In the light of this conclusion, as well as the dissatisfaction that has been expressed over the functioning of works councils, it is perhaps of some significance that many observers of the European scene are now pointing toward several developments currently taking place in the area of collective bargaining as being of potentially

eater significance for the hievement of industrial mocracy.

Sweden, for example, recent gislation has placed a consider- ble amount of emphasis on the tension of trade union collective argaining rights as a means of omoting co-determination in eas affecting employee security, cluding matters such as disci- ine and redundancy. Similarly in aly, where industrial relations has storically been characterized as an uncoordinated, multi-tiered stem, ranging from what are rtually political negotiations with e government at the top to formal bargaining by workers' elegates at the bottom," collec- ve bargaining has increasingly ome to dominate the industrial cene since the late 1960s, and as thus become the main instru- ent of workers' participation in at country. Indeed, even in ermany, where boardroom repre- entation has the longest history nd where the performance of orks councils is generally onsidered to have been the most

...several developments currently taking place in the area of collective bargaining are seen as being of potentially greater significance for the achievement of industrial democracy

satisfactory, growing worker dissatisfaction with existing representative arrangements has led to pressure for increased union recognition at plant level, including the recognition of shop stewards, a development that is clearly likely to increase the scope for the continued evolution of enterprise-level bargaining.

This increased emphasis on collective bargaining as a means of promoting 'participation' helps illustrate the fallacy involved in linking the concept too closely with the existence of special institutional machinery for regularizing worker-management relations. What is of primary importance, of course, is not the mere existence of additional institutions, but rather the extent to which workers are normally able to exert an influence on the decision-making process within the enterprise.

In practice, collective bargaining may prove just as effective in promoting worker participation as institutions such as works councils or worker directors. Indeed, by bargaining with employers, workers acting through their unions may potentially take part in many industrial decisions, and thus by gradually enlarging the scope of collective bargaining, and thereby shrinking the area of management prerogative, workers may be able to achieve a substantial degree of effective influence.

As with other institutions for furthering participation, however, collective bargaining has its limitations. In the first place participation through this channel may be limited by the fact that bargaining frequently takes place only at discrete intervals, thus making it inappropriate as a device for providing a rapid and direct response to a variety of day-to-day problems. Also, a wide variety of issues are traditionally excluded from the scope of bargaining, while those that are included tend to be defined largely in terms of their pecuniary implications, a fact which effectively excludes a variety of broader social issues from active consideration. Perhaps of most importance, however, is the fact that the use of collective bargaining as the *sole* means of providing increased participation begs the whole question of the extent to which trade unions actually represent the labour force, as well as the thorny issue of the degree of internal democracy of the unions themselves; an issue which in turn includes such matters as the degree of concentration or bureaucratization of



"I think we finally bridged the generation gap - we're both out of work."

unions, the proximity of bargaining to the place of work, and the degree of active rank-and-file participation in union activities.

Even though many of these shortcomings are not basic to the collective bargaining process itself, and could therefore potentially be overcome by such means as the evolution of continuous bargaining, as well as the extension of its scope, they nevertheless illustrate a number of important limitations associated with the use of collective bargaining as the sole process of worker participation.

In both Canada and the U.S. the range of items included in collective agreements has increased steadily over the postwar period

One obvious point that emerges from this brief review of the European experience is the fact that pressures for increased participation within the enterprise resulted in almost all cases, in the creation of additional representative bodies such as works councils, and later in the institution of worker representation at board level. This pattern differs significantly from that followed in both North America and Britain where participation was typically pursued via the extension of the scope of collective bargaining. In both Canada and the U.S., for example, the range of items included in collective agreements increased steadily over the postwar period, with issues such as union security, improved safety, training, productivity performance, and in some cases even investment policy being added to such traditional concerns as wage rates, hours of work and employment conditions. Moreover, in addition to extensions in its scope, collective bargaining also evolved into a more continuous process, a development that undoubtedly received a powerful stimulus from pressures created by the rapid pace of technological change that characterized the North American industrial scene. In postwar Britain also collective bargaining became the pre-eminent vehicle for pursuing participation, a development which went hand in hand with the displacement by the shop stewards movement of the works councils and works committees that had emerged to meet the needs of wartime conditions.

This contrast between the experience of most European countries and that of North America and Britain raises the important question of why participation should have been extended through the emergence of different institutional forms in different countries. Ultimately, of course, the form that participation takes must grow from the intrinsic historic, economic, social and political traditions of the country concerned. However, this fact notwithstanding, certain common factors appear to have been involved in prompting the various responses that have been observed.

One important factor in accounting for these differences has undoubtedly been the existence of inter-country variations in the level at which collective bargaining has typically been conducted. In particular, where bargaining normally takes place at a level far removed from that of the shop-floor, then a participatory vacuum is created within the enterprise that is likely to generate the need for supplementary institutions of indirect participation. In Europe, for example, where centralized bargaining has predominated, joint regulation has been effectively confined to those concerns that are common to all undertakings,

Collective bargaining is inappropriate to the task of providing the degree of direct worker involvement necessary to promote the personal fulfilment of the average worker

omitting the variety of day-to-day issues that are peculiar to the individual plant. For the unions to have been in a position to fill this vacuum and thereby exercise effective control over such issues they would clearly have had to decentralize collective bargaining. Historically, however, European unions have generally been weak at the plant level, a situation that has undoubtedly been perpetuated by the strong and on-going resistence raised by employers to union attempts to establish a more viable presence within the enterprise. Moreover, the highly centralized bureaucratic structure that developed as a consequence of the organization-to-organization relationship appropriate to centralized bargaining also made the European unions rather remote from the average shop-floor worker, thereby placing an additional barrier in the way of their becoming an effective channel of participation at the enterprise level.

This situation stands in marked contrast to that which pertained in North America and postwar Britain where, at least in the private sector, decentralized plant level bargaining has predominated. Moreover, the unions in these countries generally retained much closer links with their rank-and-file membership, placing them in a much better position to provide an effective participatory channel within the enterprise through the established machinery of collective bargaining. Given this institutional background the need for

ditional representative insti-
ions was clearly much less
nounced.

wever, even though this reliance
collective bargaining has been
th an eminently natural institu-
nal response, as well as a
tentially effective means of
thering power-sharing within the
rth American context, the fact
nains that dissatisfaction with
relative performance as the
le means of furthering partici-
tion has become increasingly
despread. While several of its
itations have already been
erred to, in the Canadian
ntext two additional obser-
tions are in order.

stly, concern has been expres-
d over the possibility that
llective bargaining in this
untry is already overburdened, a
t that is seen to cast some
ubt on its ability to absorb the
der range of issues appropriate
the further extension of
rticipation.

condly, collective bargaining
s come to be associated with
e existence of an adversary
mate in industrial relations,
herein its primary preoccupation
seen to be with the extraction of
ncessions and with those issues
at divide rather than those that
ite the respective parties.

us, even if the scope of collec-
e bargaining could be readily
tended, it is argued that it would
ill be inappropriate to the task of
hieving one desired end of
creased participation, namely
at of promoting effective co-
eration between all members of
e enterprise in the interests of
dustrial peace and, hopefully,
so productive efficiency. More-
er, it should also be emphasized
at along with other forms of
direct or representative democ-
cy, such as works councils and board representation, collective bargaining is similarly inappropriate to the task of providing the degree of *direct* worker involvement necessary to promote the personal fulfilment of the average shop-floor or office worker, a requirement that has always been an important element in the advocacy of increased participation in Canada.

The advocacy of works councils for Canada begs the question of whether the existence of such co-operative labour-management bodies are the cause, or merely the consequence of labour-management co-operation

---

These observations would seem to lend support to the view that different institutional forms of participation may, in fact, have their own distinct functions. Thus it may be argued that while collective bargaining is appropriate to the promotion of effective power sharing, alternative forms of indirect representation such as works councils and boardroom representation are more appropriate to the exploration of common problems on a mutually co-operative basis, while both forms must necessarily be supplemented by some form of *direct* participation if the goal of worker fulfilment is to be successfully achieved.

In fact, it is this view that appears to have informed the advocacy of works councils in Canada as a possible corollary to collective bargaining, and as a means of facilitating a process of continuous negotiation and consultation which would, it is hoped, be instrumental in reducing the current level of industrial conflict. However, such advocacy clearly begs the question of whether the existence of co-operative labour-management bodies such as works councils is itself the cause, or merely the consequence of labour-management co-operation. Indeed to suggest that co-operation could be achieved simply by replicating such institutions is self-evidently naive.

Even suspending judgment on this issue, however, still leaves open the question of whether the institutions associated with the various forms of participation are likely to be mutually compatible in a Canadian context. In this connection the European experience is again instructive, not least because of the diversity of institutional forms of participation that already exist on that continent. Thus as far as works councils and collective bargaining are concerned the relationship between the unions and the works councils has, as we have already observed, generally been an uneasy one. Moreover this situation has become even more acute as the unions have strengthened their presence at plant level. As far as Canada is concerned, therefore, the existence of an already strong union presence at plant level would seem to suggest that any attempt to introduce works councils as a rival channel within the enterprise would be met with strong resistence and would therefore be unlikely to promote effective co-operation. Indeed, even in those sectors of the economy where unionization is relatively weak it seems likely that the introduction of such institutions, though potentially constituting a means of affording better protection to unorganized workers, would nevertheless be construed by the unions as a device designed to undermine their position as potential



"...in sickness and in health, through prosperity and recession."

representatives of the unorganized worker.

In the case of boardroom representation, the evidence from Europe points more toward the possibility of satisfactory co-existence with collective bargaining. Indeed, this conclusion gains further support from the British experience where a significant section of the trade union movement has been converted to the principle of boardroom representation as a necessary adjunct to collective bargaining. The key to the latter's conversion is undoubtedly partly associated with the fact that the form of representation supported is one that at the very least involves the effective consolidation of existing union power, if not its actual extension. Thus the lesson for Canada would seem to be that only when proposals for boardroom representation are not construed by the unions as constituting a potential threat to their existing power are they likely to be acceptable. However, such a stipulation is clearly likely to place severe constraints on the form that such participation might take. Moreover, insofar as these constraints are acceptable as a means of safeguarding or even extending union power they are unlikely to endear themselves to employers.

The type of participation with the best immediate prospect for success is probably some form of QWL scheme or some other variant of direct participation

This point effectively highlights the dilemma involved in any attempt to supplement existing forms of participation. For only if both sides are firmly convinced that their relative positions will not be adversely affected is voluntary agreement likely to be possible. Given this fact, the type of participation with the best immediate prospect for success is probably some form of quality-of-working-life scheme or some other variant of *direct* participation, simply because such forms involve less of a challenge to established managerial prerogatives or existing union power.

To summarize, it appears that, in the foreseeable future at least, the further extension of indirect or representative participation in Canada is likely to be confined to the existing channels of collective bargaining. Indeed, in the absence of legislative intervention — which would in any event be unwise in the existing climate — such supplementary forms of indirect participation as boardroom representation, even though potentially compatible with collective bargaining, are unlikely to emerge as a voluntary response to democratic pressures, at least until such innovations are perceived by both sides of industry to be a means of potentially furthering their respective interests. However, at present such perceptions appear to be a rather distant prospect. lg

From A New Role for Labour: Industrial Democracy Today, *edited by G. Sanderson in association with F. Stapenhurst. To be published in July 1978 by McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Toronto. Reprinted with permission.*

Humanization of work: a European perspective

In the European scene, it is generally not considered enough to institute programs to "humanize" work or working life while leaving the basic authority structure of the enterprise largely unchanged. Rather, it is considered that if job redesign is to be effective, it must also involve direct worker participation, including the sharing of responsibility for common tasks and the provision of realistic scope for influencing the work situation and its outcomes.

To some extent, in fact, the label "humanization of work" may be seen as a temporary compromise reached between those who want to preserve the existing structure of authority within industry, and those who want to bring about a more radical transformation in this structure. The more comprehensive term "shop-floor democracy" is, perhaps, a more adequate label for the developments that are currently taking place. Moreover, it is also worth noting that in recent years there seems to have been a fusion between *formal* representative democracy (such as boardroom representation and works councils) and shop-floor or office democracy (which includes both worker co-ordination or control of work and changes in work organization).

These developments have gained stimulus from several quarters. The unions, for their part, are broadening their area of concern to include terms of employment other than the basic bread and butter issues, while governmental concern about the quality of working life is also becoming increasingly evident in more European countries. Thus, official bodies are being established to study work methods and reforms and to disseminate information, while the European community (EEC) has set up the "European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions" with the aim of promoting research and facilitating communication in the field. In addition, laws on the work environment, co-determination and works councils are being used in various countries as skeleton legal instruments to bring about change in job design, work organization and the basic structure of authority in the workplace.

In Europe it is not considered enough to institute programs to humanize work while leaving the basic authority structure of the enterprise largely unchanged

Turning to the experience of individual countries, in **Italy** the issue of shop-floor democracy has been an important feature in recent union negotiations with management. In particular, following the wave of strikes in the "hot autumn" of 1969 some unions negotiated contracts directed toward the elimination or modification of excessively monotonous and repetitive jobs. Moreover, since then, they have also come out in favour of more specific forms of "job enrichment" (expanding jobs to allow the exercise of more judgement and skill), and work methods based on teams. In addition, they have been stressing the need to provide learning opportunities on the job, as well as pressing management to institute policies for upgrading the skills of workers. Indeed, Italian unions have been exceptional in the vigour with which they have pursued the issues of job restructuring and work reorganization. As a result of their efforts, a variety of contracts incorporating this type of provision have been signed since 1971 with a number of companies, including such large concerns as Fiat and Olivetti.

In **France,** there has also been a steady evolution toward a commitment to a more democratic work environment since the worker-student revolts of May 1968. Some leading French companies such as BSN (the glass and food conglomerate), and Renault, for example, have tried to reduce the fragmentation of work and have sought to develop solutions to the problems of job-monotony through the organization of workers into groups possessing varying degrees of autonomy. In addition, the employers' confederation, CMPE, has been negotiating with the unions on changes in working conditions, while the government, for its part, has enacted a variety of laws bearing on the issue and has established a national agency charged with the responsibility of promoting improvement in working conditions.

In contrast to the attitudes of the unions in Italy toward work restructuring, however, those in France have been much less posi-

tive. A fairly common argument put forward by the largest union confederations — the communist-dominated CGT and the leftist CFDT — is that shop-floor democracy is something that cannot be realized under the capitalistic system. Indeed, they have also argued that job reforms of the kind that have been instituted in some French companies, as well as in other Western European countries, have been purely *"individualistic"* in their orientation and as such have done little to meet the workers' *collective* needs.

However, in spite of such attitudes of confrontation expressed by central union officials, at a level closer to that of the shop-floor — where ideological concerns must frequently take second place to more practical day to day considerations — local union representatives are showing an increasing willingness to take part in work restructuring schemes.

In **Britain,** progress in the field of work reorganization has been slow, at least since the late 1960s, a fact that may partly reflect the suspicion felt by many shop stewards toward such schemes. In addition, mention must be made of the difficulties involved in reaching co-operation between the many different unions frequently represented within the same company. In those situations where changes in work organization have been effected they have generally been an adjunct to the practice of productivity bargaining. This was the case, for example, with ICI.

Efforts have recently been made however, by the government, both through the provision of research funds to stimulate innovation and through the dissemination of research results on job restructuring experiments. In 1974, for example, a 'Work Research Unit' was established within the Department of Employment. Also of interest has been the action of some multinational companies in promoting a variety of reforms in the field of work organization at their British subsidiaries — reforms which have apparently stimulated a growing interest in the matter.

Governmental concern about the quality of working life is becoming increasingly evident in most European countries

In **Germany,** where experience with various forms of indirect or representative democracy has been extensive, a government-sponsored action program of "research on the humanization of work" was announced in 1974. Under the program, companies are invited to submit proposals for work reorganization projects with part of the cost of those deemed suitable being met by the government. In the first three years of its operation, the program has been used to sponsor projects covering a wide variety of matters. Many of these have been directed primarily toward improving the physical work environment by eliminating such things as noise, dust and so on; others, however, have focussed more directly on the fundamental issue of job redesign and work reorganization.

The interest that has been expressed in these schemes by the unions has served to illustrate that their commitment to change is not merely confined to a narrowly defined form of work reorganization, but also extends to more basic reform of the authority structure of the enterprise. Accordingly, union officials have on several occasions expressed the view that humanization of work is not acceptable without co-determination.

In **Norway,** often considered the birthplace of work humanization schemes, a series of projects aimed at breaking up traditional management structures and decentralizing authority was launched jointly in the early 1960s by the Central Union Confederation and the Employers Confederation. The aim of these projects was to build work organizations based upon small groups performing common tasks, with each group being responsible for the assignment of work between its members, the planning of work to meet production schedules and the performance of a variety of maintenance, checking, and quality control tasks.

These developments in Norway were partly responsible for triggering a variety of similar experiments in **Sweden,** and as a result, a great many Swedish workplaces have been the subject of reform in recent years. In fact, in many ways the Scandinavian countries have served as a sort of experimental workshop in the field of work reorganization, with an enormous number of visitors from abroad taking sightseeing tours of the relatively abundant landscape of innovations in the area.

Amongst the most popular, and certainly the most familiar of these innovations, have been the Swedish Saab-Scania experiments with the group assembly of auto-engines, and those at Volvo's Kalmar plant, where the traditional assembly-line in car production has been totally abandoned.

As far as the Volvo experiment at Kalmar is concerned, the important basic idea in the production technology is that groups of workers, organized in teams, each with its own small workshop

within the larger plant, should provide the basic building block of the work organization. It is also considered that each team should be accountable for its own part of the assembly work (i.e., one complete function of the car, such as the electrical system), and should be able to decide on the internal division of work within the group and also, to a certain extent, on its working methods. In the words of Pehr Gyllenhammar, President of Volvo, the objective at Kalmar is, "to organize automobile production in such a way that employees can find meaning and satisfaction in their work." With this objective in mind, the Kalmar plant has aimed at providing employees with the opportunity, through the work-group system, to communicate freely, to shift among work assignments, to vary their pace, to identify themselves with the product, to be conscious and responsible for quality, and to influence their own work environment — all without prejudicing either efficiency or financial performance.

In many ways the Scandinavian countries have served as a sort of experimental workshop in the field of work reorganization

The use of a group-centered form of work organization also produced a variety of important spin-offs, firstly by stimulating the architects to design a star-shaped factory building — thereby allowing each team to have its own production area — and secondly by acting as a catalyst in producing significant innovations in the field of assembly-line technology. In particular, a new carrier has been developed that enables assembly to be carried out on stationary cars, an innovation that represents an extremely important departure from conventional moving fixed-pace assembly techniques. Moreover, the carrier is designed so that it can be easily tilted by 90 degrees in order to provide a more comfortable working position when components are being assembled on the under-part of the car.

Within the plant there are about 30 work groups each with 15-20 members. Moreover, in addition to having its own working area, each also has its own personnel facilities and collective production assignment and thus forms, in effect, a small factory within a factory. From the very beginning of the plant's operation a strong team spirit or sense of community came into being, and the new form of work organization has been very positively accepted by both production workers and white-collar workers. The various work conditions, as well as solutions to problems that may arise, are all discussed and decided upon within the teams. Inevitably differences of opinion do arise, but these do not usually present any insurmountable difficulties, and for the most part a satisfactory majority decision is possible.

In some instances it has happened that team members have not felt completely at ease within the teams, or conversely, that teams have not fully accepted a member. In these cases the company has usually been sensitive to such interpersonal problems and either at the request of the individuals or of the teams transfers have been arranged. Also in the area of team composition and interpersonal relationships, there has been a fairly general consensus that it is important for at least two women to be included in the team. This consensus seems to have arisen, at least in part, from the fact that mixed-sex teams have developed a completely different character to that of all male teams, being both more stable and promoting a different and more effective form of co-operation. It is also felt that teams with a wide age spread function more effectively.

"How can they get energy from the sun? Whenever I lie out in the sun, I get sleepy."

Supervisors and industrial engineers are not included in the team. Instead they work in pairs and, for the most part, are responsible for about three of the work teams. However, in comparison with traditional car factories, a relatively high percentage of decisions is left to the individual team. For this reason there are more opportunities for employees to influence their work situation in Kalmar than is usual in car assembly plants. This is especially true of the division of work between team members, the arrangement of work in the assembly areas, and working

Mixed-sex teams have developed a completely different character to that of all male teams, being more stable and promoting a more effective form of co-operation

ahead either to extend or obtain extra breaks (something that is usually frowned upon on conventional lines and is considered to indicate the existence of scope for speeding up the line). This flexibility is made possible by the existence of longer work cycles, the delegation of certain decisions on working methods to the workers themselves, and the 'buffers' and 'carrier' system which fixes the work rhythm less rigidly than conventional assembly-line techniques.

This does not mean, however, that there is unlimited freedom of movement and action at Kalmar. Indeed, quite the contrary, for the production system contains a definite framework for how and where the work can be done. The company and the union, for example, have an agreement on the quantity of work to be done at

Efficiency at Kalmar is at least equal to, if not better than, Volvo's conventional assembly facilities in Sweden

the plant. How often the assembly carriers move from one workstation to the next is thus based upon the production program, the agreed quantity of work and the number of workers.

With regard to the effectiveness of these developments in promoting improvements in the quality of working life (including improvements in both physical and psychological conditions of work) and the democratization of the workplace, interviews with workers at the Kalmar plant suggest that they feel they do have an opportunity to influence their work situation both directly in their immediate jobs and indirectly through elected representatives. Moreover, on the basis of statistical information on assembly times, control and adjustment times, capacity utilization, losses in balancing the different work stations and so on, it has been concluded that efficiency at Kalmar is at least equal to, if not better than, Volvo's conventional assembly facilities in Sweden.

In particular, the quantity of white-collar work required per completed car is less than in a conventional factory, primarily because the Kalmar plant's organization calls for fewer supervisors. Also, thanks to the flexible carrier system, it is easier to revise the balancing of the assembly line when new or modified products are to be introduced. Moreover, absenteeism and labour turnover are both considerably lower at Kalmar; however, care must be exercised before attributing too much causal significance to the effects of the innovative production system as the figures are obviously influenced by other factors, such as the labour market situation prevailing in different regions. Finally, despite the fact that the task of working out the details of the industrial engineering and planning have been turned over to the teams, assembly time at Kalmar is about the same as the traditional plant. Thus, while such changes should theoretically have meant longer assembly times, this has not occurred in practice because Kalmar's work organization has resulted in less "down time." In fact, Kalmar has achieved a higher degree of capacity utilization (96 per cent) compared with the traditional factory.

However, in purely economic terms — the kind of criteria that are, after all, most likely to affect management planning decisions — how effective has the experiment at Kalmar been? Although the estimated investment cost for the Kalmar plant was 10 per cent above that for a conventional plant, it is anticipated that the flexible layout, when used to full capacity, will pay for the higher investment. It must be added that at a time of world economic recession that goal of full capacity utilization may be hard to realize. But the fact remains that Kalmar does show that it is possible, in principle at least, to meet both the criteria of organizational effectiveness and those of improving the quality of working life. lg

The foregoing was adapted by The Labour Gazette *from a paper by* **Reine Hansson** *of Sweden's Council for Personnel Administration to a conference on industrial democracy held under the auspices of the University of Toronto in November 1977.*

Confederation College seminar

The future of collective bargaining in the federal public service

by Roy LaBerge

Fears that ceilings on the compensation of public service employees will continue in Canada's post-controls period were expressed by union leaders during the 1977 autumn seminar on the future of collective bargaining in the public service, at Confederation College in Thunder Bay, Ont.

They also expressed concern that there will be further limitations on their members' right to strike, and found little to allay their fears in an address by Tom Lefebvre, parliamentary secretary to the President of the Treasury Board, who told them that, in the final analysis, the future of public service collective bargaining "will depend on the attitude of the Canadian public."

Several speakers, both union and management, expressed doubts that people not directly involved in collective bargaining can understand the process, and they included in that category not only the public but also the journalists who inform — or misinform — the public about it and the politicians who frame the laws that govern it.

The Nov. 25-26 seminar drew 56 participants, most of them from unions, and several speakers complained that only a handful of management people were present. For a day and a half they discussed the topic in workshops and questioned both union and employer spokesmen.

The speakers included Lefebvre; Andrew Stewart, president of the Public Service Alliance of Canada; Donald Munro, Member of Parliament for Esquimault-Saanich and, until recently, the Progressive-Conservative public service critic; William Findlay, executive vice-president of the Letter Carriers Union of Canada, and Gordon M. Allan, group chief in the Treasury Board's staff relations and compensation division.

Lefebvre presented this description of the public image of public service employees: "For some time now they have been perceived in many areas as fat cats, overpaid and underworked, with an opportunity to retire early on a generous, indexed pension. They are accused of holding the public at ransom by striking essential services and thus extracting more than their fair share through the bargaining process."

Lefebvre said he himself did not accept these sweeping criticisms. "In my view," he observed, "the great majority of federal public servants are hard working, responsible employees who have never taken part in a strike of any kind."

"Public service employees are perceived as fat cats, overpaid and underworked, with an opportunity to retire early on a generous, indexed pension."

He pointed out that during the past 10 years more than 450 collective agreements had been reached with only 15 legal strikes, most of them of very short duration. Most of the work stoppages that did result in disruption of essential services were illegal stoppages "and thus attracted justifiable criticism" of the collective bargaining system.

He warned that when controls are removed, "if we should again return to a wage-price spiral aggravated by a high frequency of disruptive strikes, the cry will again be heard that collective bargaining, not only in the federal public service but in all areas of our economy, has failed as an acceptable process for resolving wage disputes. On the other hand, if moderation and restraint are practised in determining wages and prices, collective bargaining, as we know it, will continue to be utilized as a viable process." Lefebvre, who said he was presenting the Treasury Board position, also predicted that current legislative provisions dealing with unlawful work stoppages and with safety and security will be revised "to ensure that the safety and security of the public are protected in the event of a strike, whether legal or illegal."

Findlay said he saw a clear danger that "free collective bargaining will be taken away by the government," and he blamed this on "unfair

coverage given by the media in their efforts to sell newspapers."

"The federal government would jump on any bandwagon to gain public support, which is very shaky at the moment," the LCUC officer added, "and would not think twice about removing the right to strike from the public service."

Dr. Arjun Aggarwal, instructor of industrial relations at the College and chairman of the seminar, pointed out that the record of strikes in the public service is not nearly as bad as is frequently depicted. "The present Public Service Staff Relations Act, for all its flaws, has worked very satisfactorily," he said. "We need to strengthen and preserve it for the benefit of our entire employer-employee relations, not to weaken it." Strikes cannot be ended by making them illegal, Aggarwal contended, for employees would just continue to strike — illegally.

Stewart also expressed concern about the image of public service employees and their unions: "Every time Canada is perceived to be facing a crisis, the citizens of Canada and, indeed, many politicians at all levels single out public service employees as scapegoats."

The PSAC president also expressed apprehension about the role of the monitoring agency the government intends to establish in the post-controls period. "We've been told not to worry about it because it's not going to have any teeth," Stewart argued. "I remind everyone that we saw a commission put in place back in 1970 and 1971. It was called John Young's Prices and Incomes Commission. It was not supposed to have any teeth either. But we all know that the guidelines which were developed by John Young became maximums for public service employees and guidelines for everyone else in the country." That, Stewart suggested, "could well happen again" with the post-controls monitoring agency.

"The great majority of public servants are hard working, responsible employees who have never taken part in a strike of any kind."

He was also concerned about how long the post-controls period would last: "Some people think it isn't that bad; it's only going to be for a few months. But I am very much afraid the post-controls period will be from now on."

Stewart also predicted a stormy industrial relations future unless the income gap is narrowed between workers at the bottom of the wage scale and those at the top. "How long will low-wage earners acquiesce peacefully to this discriminatory wage-and-salary structure?" he asked.

"Because the government is committed to a policy of relating the salaries paid to their employees to the salaries of taxpayers doing similar work, bargaining agents will have difficulty securing rates of pay for their members in the low-wage bracket in excess of wages paid by good employers in the private sector."

He said many of the frustrations of low-wage public service employees may be directed at their union as well as at their employer: "Wildcat strikes and demonstrations could occur more frequently, and perhaps attempts to change bargaining agents or union leadership — not that other agents or leadership will have any simple solutions to the complex problems."

Stewart and Allan both predicted that broader-based bargaining will be part of the future of public service industrial relations. They pointed out that the present multiplicity of bargaining groups — 44 represented by the Alliance alone — coupled with the general use of one-year agreements under the Anti-Inflation Program, are taxing the negotiating resources of both unions and management.

"We are both looking for some way out of this dilemma," Allan said, "But it is not going to be easy, given the present legislative structure and the occupational categories that now exist."

Findlay and Allan both noted that the Public Service Staff Relations Board is overworked because of the high number of grievances sent to the adjudication stage — averaging more than 600 a year.

Allan said that the "bureaucracy that has been built up by legislation" has been one of the biggest problems. "The changes that should come in the future should ease the administrative workload that plagues all of us," he added. "Maybe we should start to make a more concerted effort to reach an agreement between ourselves rather than overburden the Board."

Findlay agreed that more grievances should be handled by management and unions themselves, but he was critical of the attitude and ability of many of the government's staff relations officers. "Too many of them spend their time looking for the next step up the promotional ladder instead of doing their job and looking after staff relations in the proper sense," the LCUC officer contended. "This causes turmoil, frustration and a backlog of grievances."

The 1967 legislation that established federal public service

bargaining has come under scrutiny from a joint Parliamentary committee which has made recommendations for amendments. But Findlay questioned whether "the people who sat on the committee really have the feeling for and understanding of the changes that are needed to make collective bargaining work in the public service."

Munro, who was a member of the committee, said he and his fellow Parliamentarians could well have spent two or three days at bargaining sessions to enhance their understanding of the process, "but we did not do so."

But Stewart said three days would not be enough exposure to the process: "To assess what is appropriate in terms of legislation you would have to go through negotiations from beginning to end, to be a party to it, to feel the frustrations involved in the system, whether from one side or the other."

Allan later referred to collective bargaining as a "black art" because "people not involved in the process have no understanding of it, and no feeling for it."

Allan also said he hopes the future of public service collective bargaining will include changes in the procedure for designating employees who are not allowed to strike because their work is considered essential to the safety and security of the public. When a union and employer cannot agree on the list of such employees, it is sent to the PSSRB for resolution. But the contract dispute cannot go to a conciliation board until the designations have been decided. "In more than a couple of cases the bargaining agent negotiators have thrown up their hands and said 'to hell with it, we'll agree with your proposals,' only so that they can get to a conciliation board," the Treasury Board official said.

Broader-based bargaining will be part of the future of public service industrial relations

He also pointed out that, with only one exception, in every instance where a strike has occurred, "the designated employees, in the main, have not reported for work." The exception was in the case of air traffic controllers "and they don't have to worry because a decision has been made that in a strike situation commercial flying will be shut down." In some cases, he said, designated employees have not reported for work as part of strike strategy, and at other times they have been blocked by fear of crossing a militant picket line.

Allan said it is not easy to define an essential service, and the 1967 Public Service Staff Relations Act made no attempt to do so. "What you read about now in the papers is taking away the right to strike in essential services, whatever that may be, and that is not something new. People have been trying for the last 15 to 20 years to decide what is or is not an essential service. Ultimately it comes down to: essential to whom and at what time."

Munro proposed the creation of a public interest disputes commission as the forum "for the resolution of all matters affecting employer-employee relations in the public service" and in which "the whole collective bargaining process could take place." It would have a chairman, a member from the union, a member from the Treasury Board as the employer, and two or more "auditors" chosen from consumer groups, service clubs or United Funds to represent the public. Should a strike become inevitable, the commission would supervise a secret strike ballot. Munro also suggested it might be a good idea to let "wives" take part in the strike vote.

The MP's suggestion got little support at the seminar. Most participants agreed that "auditors," ignorant of the "black art" of collective bargaining, could make little, if any, useful contribution to the process. lg

Toronto Star Syndicate

"Now that we've consolidated all our debts, we'll just have one bill we can't pay!"

Industry and expedited arbitration: alternatives to traditional methods

by A.C. Sinclair

Enlightened, intelligent and flexible industrial relations practitioners in several industries in Canada have worked out mechanisms that have overcome many of the limitations of the conventional grievance arbitration process. Labour Canada has recently undertaken a major study of such methods of "industry" or "expedited" arbitration, and it is the purpose of this article to summarize its findings.

Expedited grievance arbitration systems enable union and management officials to adopt new approaches to grievance arbitration that might contribute to a reduction in delays, lessening of costs, minimizing of procedural formalities, as well as reduction of case volume.

The term *expedited arbitration* encompasses systems used in specific industries whereby a "permanent" arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators is selected to hear grievances arising under one or more collective agreements over a period of time, as well as any procedures or mechanisms designed to expedite the grievance arbitration process.

The commitment of both labour and management in Canada to the expedited handling of grievances is a growing trend which has helped to ensure that arbitration processes have not become clogged to the extent that they are no longer able to perform their vital function, namely, the prompt resolution of disputes. In an effort to handle grievances more efficiently, there has been experimentation with both new forms and new applications of expedited arbitration. This approach has been found to have relative merit when compared with traditional grievance arbitration which usually involves the disposition of grievances by arbitrators or arbitration boards chosen or constituted on a case by case basis. With industry and expedited arbitration, however, a permanent arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators is selected to hear grievances arising under one or more collective agreements over a period of time. In addition, pre-arbitration time-saving procedures have been established.

A.C. Sinclair is Chief of Arbitration Services, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Labour Canada.

Labour Canada has initiated extensive research into various forms of industry and expedited grievance arbitration systems. The industries examined were railways, longshoring, steel, construction, motor transport, garment, auto and forest industries.

It should be emphasized that the grievance resolution mechanisms outlined in this study were established and developed by the parties to forestall or resolve a wide spectrum of problems particular to their industry. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of the vital railway and longshoring industries falling under federal jurisdiction. Both sides in these industries have developed specialized and effective techniques over the years to ensure that grievances, or matters that might become the object of grievance disputes, are expertly and expeditiously disposed of in a manner conducive to good labour-management relations.

In an effort to handle grievances more efficiently, there has been experimentation with both new forms and new applications of expedited arbitration

For example, the Canadian Railway Office of Arbitration, which was established in 1965 and is based in Montreal, is a sole arbitrator mechanism covering the vast majority of railway industry organizations in Canada as well as most of the industry's unionized workforce. In this industry, grievances that remain unsettled after processing through the collective agreement grievance procedure are referred for a binding decision to a permanent sole arbitrator, the latter being selected by labour and management for a one year term. The present sole arbitrator has acted continuously since 1968, and receives an annual salary as well as personal expenses.

Arbitration requests are filed with the Office by the eighth day of the month preceding that in which the hearing is to take place. These requests are accompanied by concise factual statements and contain no argument. On the second Tuesday of each month the sole arbitrator hears those

sputes that have been filed with e Office. A number of cases are enerally disposed of in one hear- g, which usually lasts from one two days. The hearings are overned by a high degree of formality, thus witnesses are alled only infrequently and legal ounsel are rarely used. The wards are relatively short and oncise and are frequently ndered within a week of the earing. They are circulated to all ie parties by the Office and are fficiently comprehensible and aborate for use as precedent in a ecialized industry context.

longshoring, a number of inno- ative grievance resolution mecha- sms have been adopted at arious ports in Canada.

or example, although the agree- ent between the Maritime mployers Association (MEA) and ocal 269 of the International ngshoremen's Association (ILA) the Port of Halifax contains a rmal grievance and arbitration rocedure, the vast majority of ievances in the port are in fact andled through a labour-manage- ent committee chaired by a nciliation officer from a local alifax Labour Canada office. The ommittee meets on an ad hoc asis at the request of either party nd convenes on the average once week.

t Saint John, the agreement etween the Maritime Employers ssociation and Local 273 of the ternational Longshoremen's ssociation contains both a ormal grievance procedure, and ne for situations whose urgency such as to render impractical ie time limits imposed by the ormal procedure. However, where ie normal route is followed, the arties frequently agree to waive ertain steps in order to proceed irectly to arbitration.

t Montreal, Trois-Rivières and

In the construction industry, the volume of grievance arbitration has remained relatively low over the years

Quebec, most disputes are settled "on-the-spot" without formal grievances being launched. Should such grievances arise, however, they are submitted to a grievance committee which meets weekly on a set day to settle grievances in an expeditious and informal manner. Where grievances reach the arbitration stage, and these are generally few in number, they are submitted with only a short delay to a previously agreed upon sole arbitrator.

At Hamilton, monthly labour-management meetings, held between the MEA and Local 1654 of the ILA have virtually eliminated the need for the launching of formal grievances and have also brought about a high rate of settlement of potential grievances.

In those West Coast ports coming under the agreement between the British Columbia Maritime Employers Association and the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, a Job Arbitrator, drawn from the longshoring industry, and paid a monthly retainer whose cost is borne equally by the parties, disposes of disputes requiring an urgent, oral and on-the-spot decision. This oral "Summary Disposition" is then confirmed in writing, usually within 48 hours. In the rare event that either party requests a re-hearing of a matter on which the Job Arbitrator has rendered a decision, the question is referred to a Joint Industry Labour Relations Committee, on which labour and management representatives sit in equal numbers. The Committee issues its award within a short time. In those rare instances where the parties are not satisfied with the Committee's decision, the matter is referred to an "Industry Arbitrator." The present Industry Arbitrator is a retired management official. There is no recourse to "outside" arbitration under the B.C. MEA — ILWU agreement.

To cite an example from another industry, the United Steelworkers of America and the International Nickel Company of Canada Limited established the Grievance Commissioner System in 1972 to provide an expeditious means for promoting the effective disposition of those grievances which the parties have agreed may be handled in a summary manner at the arbitration stage. The system is incorporated in the parties' collective agreements applying to union Locals 6500 and 6200 and covering approximately 15,000 workers in Sudbury and Port Colborne, Ontario.

Where a disagreement arises with respect to the interpretation, application or alleged violation of a collective agreement, and it is not satisfactorily resolved under the applicable grievance procedure, then management and union representatives may agree to submit the grievance to a Grievance Commissioner. Failing agreement at this stage, the grievance may be submitted to an arbitration board whose chairman is selected from a panel specified in the collective agreement.

Two Grievance Commissioners, named in the agreement, serve alternately on a monthly basis as sole arbitrators. Hearings are held on the third Thursday of each month. The parties provide the Commissioner with specified grievance procedure documentation and, not less than ten days before the hearing, they supply him and each other with additional concise

written representations. Hearings are highly informal and generally no witnesses are called, as the Commissioner relies largely on the written summaries submitted by the parties. Furthermore, the latter are not represented by legal counsel, nor is it usual for precedents to be cited. Several cases are usually heard in a day, with the average hearing time per case being about half an hour. Brief awards are issued within seven days of the hearing. However, they do not constitute a precedent, nor may they be used as such by either party in future cases.

The Ontario Joint Grievance Committee provides an alternative arbitration method under collective agreements between the Motor Transport Industrial Relations Bureau of Ontario (Inc.), a trucking company association, and various Teamster locals in Ontario and Quebec. For example, a party wishing to proceed to arbitration after the last step decision of an agreement's grievance procedure, may submit the grievance either to a conventional ad hoc tripartite board of arbitration or to the Ontario Joint Grievance Committee. The latter consists of two nominees appointed by the unions (two senior officers from locals other than the one involved in the grievance) and two Bureau nominees (two senior management personnel, usually Bureau Directors, whose company is not involved in the hearing). The nominees are drawn from union and Bureau panels consisting generally of experienced representatives engaged in the day-to-day administration of the agreements.

...frequent use is made of "instant" or..."quickie" arbitrations...usually a simultaneous "lay-down of tools," going home or "parading" at the entrance of a construction project while the union wins its point

The Committee's hearings are held regularly in Toronto for two days during the first week of each month, and at three month intervals in other locations. Hearing dates are scheduled well in advance and committee members are usually readily available. A number of cases may be heard on any given day.

The decisions provided by the Committee are final and binding and are usually released to the parties on the day following the hearing, however, again the awards cannot be cited as precedents in future cases. If the Committee is unable to render a majority decision (i.e., in the event of a deadlock), the grieved party may either withdraw the grievance or submit it to an ad hoc tripartite arbitration board within a specified period. In most cases, however, the Committee has issued majority decisions.

In the clothing industry, several collective agreements between the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union in Montreal and employers associations, or individual companies, contain an expedited grievance resolution and arbitration mechanism.

There are three steps in the grievance procedure, prior to arbitration, and although there are no time limits specified in the collective agreements for completing these steps, the grievance procedure is normally exhausted within one or two days. Moreover, grievances are usually quickly resolved and only a small number are ever submitted to arbitration.

The parties do not encounter delays in finding suitable arbitrators, as two experienced specified persons with a long history of involvement in garment industry arbitrations are readily available.

"I don't worry about mandatory retirement at 65 — my birthday falls on February 29th"

hile there are no regular hearing tes or time limits for the holding hearings, the latter generally ke place within a short period of ne, subject only to the availaity of a date agreeable to both rties. Hearings are highly formal and a case is usually disosed of within one to two hours. wyers are seldom involved and ecedents are rarely cited. rther, while there are no time nits specified for the rendering awards, the latter are normally ncise and issued within one ek of the hearing.

similar expedited grievance ndling mechanism was estabshed about 20 years ago by the malgamated Clothing Workers ronto Market Joint Board and an nployers association. An expeted grievance arbitration echanism is also contained in e Memorandum of Agreement tween the Montreal Joint Board essmakers' Union of the Interational Ladies' Garment Workers' nion and the Montreal Dress and portswear Manufacturers' Guild, plying to approximately 13,000 orkers.

hile the aforementioned agreent contains no pre-arbitration ievance procedure, grievances e in fact processed in a few days rough an informal pre-arbitration rocedure. A grievance remaining nsettled is, as the agreement rovides, submitted to specified nd experienced arbitrators, ppointed for the agreement's uration, within 24 hours after one arty notifies the other of its esire to have the matter arbiated. An expedited and highly nformal hearing is held within a hort time thereafter and usually isposes of the case within two to our hours. Awards must be endered within 48 hours of the earing unless the parties agree to n additional delay of 48 hours.

n the auto industry, UAW agreements do not generally provide for expeditious grievance processing prior to arbitration. Increased screening of grievances at the pre-arbitration stage has, however, stabilized arbitration case volume. Most collective agreements to which the UAW is a party provide for permanent sole arbitrators, with agreements between the union and major companies generally specifying panels from which sole arbitrators are drawn.

...a significant number of grievances are settled at the early stages of the grievance procedure either as a result of pressure tactics or in a more positive context

Several UAW agreements also specify the order in which different types of grievances are to be heard at arbitration hearings. In order of priority, these are grievances involving discharge, suspension, improper layoff, policy matters and leave of absence. Urgent cases are given priority even where a specific order is not set out in the agreement.

In contrast to the general pattern in the auto industry, the agreement between the UAW and General Motors does, in fact, contain an optional expeditious procedure for accelerating the hearing and award phases of the arbitration process. The procedure has, however, rarely been followed.

The summary arbitration procedure put forward by the Quebec Advisory Council on Labour and Manpower (le conseil consultatif du travail et de la main-d'oeuvre du Quebec) is intended to provide an alternative grievance arbitration route which parties might follow for specific grievances or types of grievances. Parties may integrate this summary procedure as an appendix to their agreement, incorporate it into their grievance resolution provisions, add the summary procedure to their agreement for a trial period, or agree to derogate from the regular collective agreement grievance procedure for one or more specified grievances.

Some minor differences between these approaches notwithstanding, the main features of this summary arbitration procedure may be summarized as follows: grievances processed through this procedure may only be disposed of by those sole arbitrators agreed upon by the parties in advance (this includes the drawing of arbitrators' names from a previously determined list according to some mutually acceptable order of priority); the parties must, within five days, jointly state their case in a written document and forward it to the arbitrator; unless otherwise agreed, the arbitrator must convene a hearing not later than 10 days after receipt of the joint written document; the hearing must not last more than one day, except with the consent of the parties; and lastly a final and binding award, rendered in summary form and dealing only with the issues and arguments raised in the parties' joint written document, must be issued within five working days of the hearing's conclusion, although the latter award, it should be added, does not constitute a precedent. The arbitrator receives an all-inclusive fee of $200 per grievance. If more than two grievances are heard in the same day the fee is reduced to $150, beginning with the third grievance.

In the forest products industry, Forest Industrial Relations Limited represents approximately 120 companies operating in the coastal region of British Columbia. These companies employ about 28,000 members of the International Woodworkers of America, and those employees constitute a high proportion of the 48,000 IWA

members employed in the province's forest industry.

The pre-arbitration grievance procedure contained in the master agreement between FIR and local unions of Regional Council No. 1 of the IWA involves five steps and a maximum total delay of about 60 days. The arbitration stage involves permanent panels of arbitrators and hence offers an example of "industry arbitration." If a grievance remains unresolved after the grievance procedure has been exhausted, it is submitted to a sole arbitrator drawn from a preselected panel of four arbitrators listed in the agreement. Where the parties are unable to agree on the selection of an arbitrator from among the panel, they must request the Minister of Labour to appoint one from among the panel. If these panel arbitrators are not available, the parties may request the Minister to appoint a temporary replacement. Hearings are held in Vancouver, or at such other places as the parties may agree upon. Awards must be rendered within fourteen days of the hearing, and the arbitrator's fees and expenses are shared equally by the parties.

In addition to the above system for the resolution of grievances involving individuals and specific companies, there also exists, under the same agreement, a mechanism providing for a "right of reference" with respect to general matters concerning the application of a collective agreement. When a problem arises between FIR and the IWA regarding the interpretation of the collective agreement that could affect the industry generally, the matter is referred to a "Right of Reference Committee" composed of six representatives, three of whom are selected by the IWA and the remainder by the companies represented in the negotiation of the agreement. If the Committee members fail to agree upon a satisfactory interpretation of the point in question, either party may refer the matter to a permanent "interpreter," or if an "interpreter" is not available, the parties may request the Minister of Labour to appoint a Judge, either of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal of British Columbia, to act in this capacity.

"A cup of coffee and two straws, please."

...there is no standard industry or expedited grievance arbitration procedure in the construction industry...

A number of agreements involving the IWA in other regions of the province contain similar procedures for the arbitration of individual grievances on the one hand, and for the resolution of more general matters relating to collective agreement interpretation, on the other. Mechanisms providing for permanent arbitrators or permanent panels of arbitrators are prevalent, although they have no particular expeditious features.

In the construction industry, the volume of grievance arbitration has remained relatively low over the years. While the reasons for this may vary from time to time and from place to place, several factors have been perennial contributors.

First, frequent use is made of "instant" or, what is commonly referred to in the industry as "quickie," arbitrations. These are essentially illegal work stoppages that might involve a simultaneous "lay-down of tools," going home or "parading" at the entrance of a construction project while the union wins its point.

Secondly, a significant number of grievances are settled at the early stages of the grievance procedures, either as a result of pressure tactics or in a more positive context.

Thirdly, the volume of grievances is controlled because the inherent characteristics and structure of the construction industry give rise to a smaller number of specific types of grievances than arise in other industries. Thus, generally speaking, dismissals in the common law provinces are seldom contested, except in the case of

) stewards. This is largely due to
e widespread use of the hiring
ll through which union business
ents select the contractor's
aff, a generally acknowledged
nployer right to determine the
alifications and performance of
despeople, and a lack of senior-
provisions in the collective
reements. Moreover, since
nstruction tradespeople offer
eir services to several contrac-
rs on a time basis as their skills
e required, unions generally
knowledge that seniority provi-
ons are not practical in the
cumstances. The types of
sputes that reach the arbitration
age generally involve the inter-
etation of collective agreement
ovisions relating to monetary
atters such as overtime, travel-
g time, shift premiums, call-in-
y, board allowances, camp
andards or subletting.

urthly, while the construction
dustry grievance procedures
ually contain three steps (union-
ed foreman at the first step,
oject superintendent or manager
the second step and the general
anager of head office of the
rporation at the third step),
me trades in certain jurisdic-
ns make use of a joint labour-
anagement board mechanism
nich provides a final opportunity
attempt to settle a dispute short
arbitration.

ence there is no standard indus-
y or expedited grievance arbitra-
n procedure in the construction
dustry, although there are a
mber of relevant mechanisms in
me provinces at both the pre-
bitration and arbitration stages.

Ontario, the construction indus-
y frequently refers, as an alter-
ative recourse, to grievance arbi-
ation, by applying to the Ontario
abour Relations Board under
ection 112 of the Labour Rela-
ns Act.

Quebec, the grievance arbitra-

Enlightened, intelligent and flexible industrial relations practitioners in several industries in Canada have worked out mechanisms that have overcome...the conventional grievance arbitration process

tion case volume is influenced by the fact that the Construction Industry Labour Relations Act provides that only certain matters may be arbitrated by sole arbitrators. These matters cover, for example, union security, union dues, and disciplinary measures taken by employers. On the other hand, most monetary claims are processed by inspectors of the Quebec Construction Board, which presents outstanding claims to the courts on behalf of the affected employees.

In British Columbia a number of unions participate in a Joint Conference Board to which grievances not resolved at the early stages of the grievance procedure may be referred. The Board provides a last chance to settle a dispute before it is referred to arbitration. Other unions, especially those representing workers in basic trades such as labourers, operators and cement masons, participate in a Construction Industry Advisory Board which appoints, from among its members, panels who arbitrate grievances, sometimes with a natural chairman either agreed upon by the panel members or appointed at their request by the Minister of Labour. As a result of these mechanisms, the grievance dispute settlement procedures established under the provincial labour code are used only infrequently in the construction industry.

In Prince Edward Island, where most grievances are resolved at the first level in five days, unresolved grievances may be referred to a Joint Conference Board of three union and three management members. It convenes every two months and usually renders a decision within seven days of the hearing.

In Manitoba, most agreements call for a joint Conference stage, but few grievances reach it. While in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, the provincial labour relations act require that unresolved grievances be referred to a sole arbitrator on the day that they arise. There are no industry or expedited grievance mechanisms in Saskatchewan and the few grievances that do need arbitration are referred to tripartite boards on an ad hoc basis. In Alberta, too, formal grievance procedures are rarely resorted to and, grievances are referred to ad hoc arbitration boards, as needed.

Most of the mechanisms have undoubtedly reduced or eliminated all or many of the inherent defects in the conventional grievance process. In varying degrees, they have reduced arbitration costs, delays and case volume. In the adoption of these mechanisms, parties have been able to secure, on a long-term basis, the services of persons having a high degree of industry expertise. They have also made use of informal and flexible techniques to satisfy their particular requirements. This has helped reduce the labour-management tensions and frustrations that would otherwise have resulted through the accumulation of unresolved grievance disputes. Measures instrumental in substantially diminishing recourse to conventional arbitration, as well as those developed to dispose of potentially disruptive grievances, have played an important role in alleviating labour-management friction. lg

A copy of the study may be obtained by writing to Arbitration Services, Labour Canada, Ottawa, K1A 0J2

Labour legislation in Canada, 1977

Part IB: Labour relations — public sector

by Nicole Marchand

Three jurisdictions introduced legislation in 1977 affecting employer-employee relations in the public sector. Alberta adopted a new Act regulating collective bargaining for public employees, and British Columbia amended the Public Service Act on adjudication of grievances. In Québec a new Civil Service Act was introduced and legislation dealing with conditions of employment for policemen of the Montreal Urban Community was amended.

The Public Service Employee Relations Act was adopted in May 1977 and proclaimed in force on September 23 by the **Alberta** Government. The new legislation establishes the framework of collective bargaining for public employees and amends several Acts, including sections of the Public Service Act dealing with employee relations.

Under the Public Service Employee Relations Act, the parties to negotiations are the Public Service Commissioner representing the Crown in right of Alberta, and a trade union acting on behalf of the employees in a bargaining unit, whether or not certified.

The Act creates the Public Service Employee Relations Board (PSERB) consisting of five appointees of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, one of whom acts as chairman. The PSERB is responsible for dealing with certification proceedings. Upon application for certification, the

Nicole Marchand is Chief, Legislative Analysis, Labour Canada.

PSERB inquires into whether the union is a proper bargaining agent and whether a majority of the employees in the unit are in favour of the union as their bargaining agent. A representation vote may be conducted by the Board but it is not compulsory.

Collective bargaining may commence 10 days after notice to bargain has been given. When a collective agreement is in effect such notice may be given not less than 30 days and not more than 90 days before the expiry of the agreement. If no agreement is in force, the notice may be given at any time.

Mediation may be requested at any time during negotiations. The parties may also request that matters remaining in dispute be referred to binding arbitration. The request is accompanied by a list of items in dispute. If only one party makes the request, the other party is given the opportunity to add items to the list. The Public Service Employee Relations Board must be satisfied that the parties have made reasonable efforts to resolve their dispute by negotiation and that it is an appropriate time to establish an arbitration board. The PSERB supplies the arbitration board with the list of arbitral items to be resolved. Only those matters that may be included in a collective agreement may be referred to aribration. Matters such as organization of work, assignment of duties, the systems of job evaluation, appointments, promotions, transfers and pensions may not be included in an arbitral award. An arbitral award is binding on the parties and strikes and lockouts are expressly prohibited.

A collective agreement may provide for the employer to deduct trade union dues or a sum equal to those dues from the pay of every employee in the bargaining unit. An agreement may also make membership in a trade union a condition of employment. The Act requires that every agreement provide for final settlement of differences by adjudication or otherwise. If an agreement does not so provide, the Act contains detailed provisions for dealing with grievances which are deemed to be included in the agreement.

In **British Columbia,** the Public Service Act was amended effective November 23, 1977. The amendment provides that the chairman of the Public Service Adjudication Board may investigate, hear and determine a grievance, or refer a grievance to a vice-chairman or to a person who is not a member of the board as a single adjudicator or arbitrator. A decision or award may be appealed to the board on the ground that a party has been or is likely to be denied a fair hearing or that the decision is inconsistent with the principles of

e Public Service Act or any other
t dealing with labour relations.
on application of the party
ected, the board may do one of
e following; set aside the
cision rendered, remit the
atter back to the person who
ade the decision, stay the
oceedings, or substitute its
cision for the one of the person
no made it. The Court of Appeal
ay under specific conditions,
view the decision of the chair-
an, vice-chairman, panel of the
oard or the person appointed to
ar the matter.

here the government, a trade-
ion or an employee fails to
mply with a decision, either
rty affected by the decision may
e a copy of the decision in the
gistry of the Supreme Court. The
cision is then entered as if it
ere a decision of the Court and is
emed for all purposes, except
r the purpose of an appeal, to be
order of the Supreme Court and
nforceable as such.

ll 53, The Civil Service Act,
ceived First Reading on July 26
the **Québec** National Assembly.
ne Bill proposes the consolida-
on and revision of the Civil
rvice Act and the Civil Service
epartment Act. It provides for the
ganization and management of
e civil service and states that
cruitment and promotions are to
e by way of competition based on
lection according to merit.

nder the proposed legislation,
e Minister of the Civil Service is
have general responsibility for
e management of the civil
rvice. The Minister will also
egotiate collective agreements
ith certified employee associa-
ons within the scope of the
andates received from the
easury Board. With the authori-
zation of the government, he will sign collective agreements; he will also supervise the carrying out of these agreements and co-ordinate their interpretation.

The administration of the new Act would be shared between the Minister of the Civil Service, the Commission de la fonction publique and the Office du recrutement du personnel de la fonction publique. Under the general responsibility for the management of the civil service, the Minister may make regulations concerning the classification of positions, remuneration, evaluation, promotion, assignment, reclassification, transfer, availability, demotion, removal or dismissal for incompetence and disciplinary action.

The Commission de la fonction publique will hear and decide appeals on matters related to classification and reclassification, competition for promotion, demotion, removal or dismissal for professional incompetence. The Commission will also initiate inquiries regarding compliance with the Act and regulations and advise the Minister and the Treasury Board on proposed regulations.

The Office du recrutement du personnel de la fonction publique will make regulations concerning the recruitment and selection of candidates for the civil service. It will recruit and select candidates, certify their qualifications and make appointments.

On November 2, 1977 an Act respecting the Public Security Council and the Police Department of the Montreal Urban Community (Bill 57) came fully into force by proclamation of the Québec Government.

The Act brings changes to the composition, organization and functions of the Montreal Urban Community Public Security Council and to the Community Police Department. Bill 57 amends the Montreal Urban Community Act and the Charter of the City of Montreal.

Provisions relating to conditions of employment for Montreal policemen have been incorporated in the amendments to the Montreal Urban Community Act.

The conditions of employment, the retirement plan, pension plan or pension fund of members of the Police Department who are not employees within the meaning of the Labour Code are determined by the Security Council of the Montreal Urban Community.

Bill 57 establishes a bargaining committee to negotiate under the authority and in the name of the executive committee of the Community every collective agreement, retirement plan, pension plan or pension fund of all the policemen of the Police Department with the exception of those who are not employees within the meaning of the Code as mentioned above.

The bargaining committee consists of a member of the executive committee who is the only person responsible for the bargaining; a member of the Public Security Council and a representative of the director of the Police Department are also members of the Committee as advisers. Every decision of the bargaining committee approved by the executive committee binds the Public Security Council. lg

Books

Auto Work and Its Discontents:

Policy Studies in Employment and Welfare, Number 25

B.J. Widick, editor, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1976

Two characteristics distinguish this 112-page monograph from most other works on the topic. One is that it is written largely in clear and comprehensible English. The other is that the five academics who wrote its major articles or study reports — B.J. Widick, Patricia Cayo Sexton, Bill Goode, Robert Reiff and Al Nash — have all worked in an auto plant for periods which range from a minimum of three years to a maximum of fifteen, have served as union plant bargaining agents, and have retained an interest in the industry, the union and the workers.

Their consensus is that neither hypotheses based on the concepts of "job satisfaction" nor those based upon the notion "alienation" alone offer a satisfactory basis for analysis and judgment of workers' attitudes and social relations in auto factories. Neither approach, they contend, takes into account the totality of and the wide differences in the causes of job discontent, nor of the many variables that affect workers in the industry. Rather, they suggest that, "The feelings of most workers about their jobs tend to form a continuum between job satisfaction and alienation rather than a polarization around either concept."

The writers are critical of most research and academic writings on the questions of worker discontent and the quality of working life. Nash, for example, reviews thirteen major studies or articles about assembly-line auto workers and finds that most of their authors "subsume a range of QWL expressions — self-fulfilment, self-growth, self-actualization, dignity, interesting work, and job involvement — under the discussion of job satisfaction, and use them to elaborate on what they mean by satisfaction or what leads to satisfaction." Yet, he argues, factors other than the actual job affect workers' feelings, and he concludes that the investigators' findings have been coloured by their own views.

Reiff is critical of much of the usage of the term "alienation." His experience working in an auto plant has convinced him that "alienation of workers, as a personality characteristic is in the eyes of the social science beholder." He says there is no visible evidence that auto workers are "dehumanized, or mere robots" as several writers contend.

The authors note several sources of worker discontent other than personality alienation or lack of job satisfaction, arising from society itself and its middle-class value system. Widick, for example, discusses workers' grievance against "the general contempt with which factory workers, and notably assembly-line workers, are viewed." "As for much of the academic world," he writes, "the frequently expressed view of the blue-collar worker as a combination of satisfied robot or backward Archie Bunker — good only for laughs or for someone to feel superior to — adds to the antagonism, irritation and frustration of the people in the factories."

Other causes of worker discontent that spill over from other areas of society into the workplace include racial tensions, male-female antagonisms, and fears arising from abuse of drugs by fellow workers. These, they contend, have been almost totally ignored in QWL literature.

They also maintain that most studies ignore the impact of the United Auto Workers union on QWL. The union has negotiated improved wages and working conditions and provided a permanent structure for handling grievances, thus giving workers some degree of control of their QWL. Moreover, as Sexton points out, "for many rank-and-file workers, unionism and the contest between workers and management, or between union factions, can, paradoxically, make many boring jobs endurable."

Another worthwhile contribution of this monograph is that it provides fascinating descriptions of how workers, who refuse to become robots or automatons, use hijinks and a wide range of interpersonal relationships to cope with the realities of workplaces that are frequently "dirty, grimy, noisy, uncomfortable and unattractive." This vicarious exposure may be helpful, although somewhat foreign, to the many people now writing about the quality of working life who have themselves

ever had to earn a living in such orkplaces over any considerable ngth of time. Many journalists ho read the monograph, particularly among those working in daily ews media, may find the milieu escribed less unfamiliar, since ney, too, frequently must practise neir trade in workplaces that are irty, grimy, uncomfortable and nattractive, though admittedly to lesser degree.

he status to which the authors ave risen since leaving the auto lant is ample testimony to their ompetence to contribute to the WL debate. At the time they repared this work, Widick was a rofessor in the graduate school f business at Columbia University; Goode was associate dean of ne Empire State Labor College; lash, an associate professor of ociology at Cornell University; eiff, professor and director of the enter for the Study of Social ntervention at the Albert Einstein ollege of Medicine, and Sexton, a rofessor of sociology at New ork University.

Unfortunately, however, there xists the possibility that the very ork experience in the industry nat has made these academics articularly competent to write this ork, may serve to disqualify them n the eyes of some of those ocial science beholders who nsist on seeing either worker lienation or job satisfaction as ne explanation for the absence or resence of worker discontent. uch faulty vision might obscure he tremendous contribution this ork has to make to the entire WL debate in North America. It is o be devoutly hoped that all such otential disclaimers of this work ill remove the motes of alienation nd job satisfaction from their eyes. Thus, seeing more clearly, they may come to agree with Professor Eli Ginzberg of Columbia University who writes in the foreword that this monograph "comes closer to the truth than any other treatment of a theme that has confused social scientists since the days of Karl Marx."

—R.L.

The Brothers Reuther

and the Story of the UAW: A Memoir

by **Victor G. Reuther,** Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976

This is a highly subjective story of the lives of the late Walter Reuther, head of the United Auto Workers, and his three brothers, Roy, Ted and Victor, written by one of them. Victor dictated the first draft from memory, supplemented by the family's personal papers which included extensive notes that Walter Reuther dictated a few hours after many of the major events in his life. It covers the period from the birth of their father, Valentine Reuther, in the German village of Edigheim on the Rhine in 1881, until Walter's death in 1971.

The Brothers Reuther tells a fascinating tale of a German immigrant who not only became a union activist himself, but also raised four sons in the growing industrial community of Wheeling, West Virginia, to take leadership roles in society. He had his boys participate in debates in the home on such social issues as child labour, prohibition and women's suffrage, judging them on both their presentation and research. So skilled did Walter become at argument and debate that, when he applied for his first job with the Ford Motor Company, he spent three hours arguing with a security guard outside the door of the employment office until the man finally broke down and admitted him for an interview with the employment manager.

That kind of persistence served Walter and his brothers well in the struggles faced by the labour movement in general and the UAW in particular. The book also tells of the risks they faced. Walter was beaten on more than one occasion. There was a kidnap attempt at a family birthday party. Both Walter and Victor were victims of attempted assassination. Indeed, the Reuther brothers battled with a formidable array of enemies — George Meany, the management of the auto companies, Communists, the Underworld and even with United States presidents. And Victor reports, with obvious pride, that the 80 sponsors of his retirement dinner were added to President Nixon's enemies' list!

Its very lack of objectivity and dissinterestedness helps make this highly personal book exciting reading. Victor describes the joys of writing it, recalling the brothers' "victories over entrenched greed and arrogance" and against "inbred bigotry and racial hatred." No family could possibly possess all the virtues ascribed to the Reuthers in this work, but Victor himself admits: "I make no pretence of 'objectivity' which is a luxury reserved for historians."

—R.L.

Additions to the Library

The publications listed below are recent acquisitions. They may be borrowed through a local library (business, university, public, etc.) or directly — if there is no local library — by writing to The Chief Librarian, Labour Canada, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0J2, indicating author, title and publisher.

Arbitration, Industrial

Canada. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services. *Industry and expedited arbitration: alternatives to traditional methods.* Ottawa, Supply and Services Canada, 1977. 80p.

Corporations, International

Clement, Wallace. *Continental corporate power: economic elite linkages between Canada and the United States.* Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1977. 408p.

International Labour Office. *Social and labour practices of multinational enterprises in the petroleum industry.* Geneva, 1977. 100p.

International Labour Office. *Social and labour practices of some U.S.-based multinationals in the metal trades.* Geneva, 1977. 172p.

Employees — Dismissal

Trades Union Congress. *Unfair dismissal.* London, 1977. 31p.

Industrial Democracy

Bernstein, Paul. *Workplace democratization: its internal dynamics.* Kent, Ohio, Comparative Administration Research Institute, distributed by Kent State University Press, 1976. 127p.

Industrial Disputes

Industrial conflict in Britain, edited by E.W. Evans and S.W. Creigh. London, Frank Cass, 1977. 292p.

Stewart, Walter. *Strike!* Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1977. 224p.

Industrial Health

Canadian law and the control of exposure to hazards, by Robert T. Franson and others. Ottawa, Supply and Services, Canada, 1977. 152p.

Science Council of Canada. *Policies and poisons;* the containment of long-term hazards to human health in the environment and in the workplace. Ottawa, Supply and Services Canada, 1977. 76p. Titre en français: L'ambiance et ses contaminants; une politique de lutte contre les agents toxiques à retardement de l'ambiance professionnelle et de l'environnement.

Williams, Roger. *Government regulations of the occupational and general environments in the United Kingdom, the United States and Sweden.* Ottawa, Supply and Services, Canada, 1977. 155p.

Industrial Relations

Turner, Herbert Arthur. *Management characteristics and labour conflict;* a study of managerial organization, attitudes and industrial relations, by H.A. Turner, Geoffrey Roberts and David Roberts. Cambridge, Eng., Cambridge University Press, 1977. 80p.

Job Enrichment

Lefebvre, Claude. *L'amélioration des conditions de travail dans les emplois administratifs,* par Claude Lefebvre et Gérard Rolloy. Paris, Chotard et associés éditeurs, 1976. 260p.

Journey to Work

Gera, Surendra. *Residential and job location and the journey-to-work:* a review and theoretical perspective, by Surendra Gera and Peter Kuhn. Ottawa, Economic Council of Canada, 1977. 100p.

Labour Conditions

Lefebvre-Girouard, Astrid. L'appauvrissement des petits salariés: étude comparative de différents groupes de travailleurs et d'anciens travailleurs devenus chômeurs ou assistés sociaux, par Astrid Lefebvre-Girouard et Nicole Gauthier. Collaboration spéciale: Jean Renaud. Montréal, Centre des services sociaux du Montréal métropolitain, 1977. 2 v.

Labour Leaders

Gernigon, Bernard. *Tenure of trade union office.* Geneva, International

our Office, 1977. 112p. Titre en çais: Procédures d'élection et destitution des dirigeants dicaux.

arus, Morden, ed. *Up from the ks;* biographical sketches of trade union leaders, past and sent. Toronto, Ontario leration of Labour, 1977. 133p.

our Turnover

:e, James Lester. *The study of nover.* Ames, Iowa, Iowa State versity Press, 1977. 160p.

ss Media and Labour

de unions and the media. ted by Peter Beharrell and Greg lo. London, Macmillan, 1977. p.

ise

nada. Department of Labour. gislative Analysis. *Occupational se legislation, 1977.* Ottawa, '7. 44, 47p. Titre en français: gislation régissant le bruit dans nilieu de travail.

ofessions

abling professions, by Ivan Illich and others. London, Marion Boyars, 1977. 127p.

Public Administration

Public administration in Canada; selected readings, edited by Kenneth Kernaghan. 3d ed. Toronto, Methuen, 1977. 372p.

Quality of Working Life

Noble, Iris. *Life on the line;* alternative approach to work. New York, Coward, McCann & Geoghagan, 1977. 95p.

What's QWL? Definitions, notes, and bibliography, by Keith Newton and Norman Leckie. Ottawa, Economic Council of Canada, 1977. 124p.

Shop Stewards

Batstone, Eric. *Shop stewards in action;* the organization of workplace conflict and accommodation, by Eric Batstone, Ian Boraston and Stephen Frenkel. Oxford, Eng., Basil Blackwell, 1977. 316p.

Wage Determination

Maslove, Allan Michael. *The compensation decisions of the Anti-Inflation Board,* by Allan M. Maslove and Gene Swimmer. Ottawa, Carleton University, Department of Economics, 1977. 27p.

Wages and Hours

Chapman (H.V.) & Associates Limited. *Management compensation in Canada, 1977;* a report on compensation in fifty senior and middle management positions. Toronto, 1977. 390p.

Women — Employment

Binkin, Martin. *Women and the military,* by Martin Binkin and Shirley J. Bach. Washington, Brookings Institution, 1977. 134p.

Dulude, Louise. *The status of women in federal crown corporations.* Ottawa, Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1977. 59p.

Work

Anthony, P.D. *The ideology of work.* London, Tavistock Publications, 1977. 340p.

Back issues of *The Labour Gazette*

A recent inventory shows that we have on hand — free for the asking — a limited number of copies of the following issues of *The Labour Gazette*:

1976: October

1977: January, February, August, October, November.

Anyone wishing to receive any of the above may obtain them by writing to: Editor, *The Labour Gazette*, Canada Department of Labour, Ottawa K1A 0J2.

PRICES, EMPLOYMENT, AND EARNINGS

THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX — DECEMBER 1977

The Consumer Price Index (1971 = 100) advanced to 167.2 in December from 166.1 in November, an increase of 0.7 per cent. This brought the year-over-year increase to 9.5 per cent, the highest twelve-month increase for two years. At the beginning of 1977 the rate of inflation was 6.1 per cent. Since then it has been increasing steadily.

Food prices were responsible for most of the December increase. A month-to-month increase of 1.6 per cent in the food index contributed 65 per cent to the overall advance. Higher prices for meat, especially beef, and fruit and vegetables — particularly fresh vegetables which increased 10.6 per cent over the month — were the main contributors to the latest increase. Moderate advances in the price of cereal and bakery products, as well as fats and oils, and lower prices for eggs and coffee, had some mitigating effects on food prices. The index for food consumed at home increased by 1.8 per cent in December to bring the index 17.7 per cent higher than December 1976, the highest twelve-month rise since May 1974.

The non-food components of the CPI increased a moderate 0.3 per cent from November and 7.4 per cent from December 1976. The latest increase was supported by higher prices for furniture and appliances along with price increases for cigarettes. Higher charges for dry cleaning services and train fares also had notable impacts. Small decreases in the recreation index and women's clothing partially off-set these price increases.



The current annual rate of change, based on seasonally adjusted movements in the latest three months, continued to increase. From October to December the monthly increases of the all-items index, seasonally adjusted at annual rates, increased to 11.2 per cent, compared with 7.4 per cent for the previous three months.

The annual average of the CPI increased 8.0 per cent in 1977 compared with 7.5 per cent in

i. The food index advanced per cent and all-items uding food rose 7.8 per cent. largest annual increase of the or components was the sing index with an increase of per cent. Annual percentage eases in other components e: clothing, 6.8; transportation, health and personal care, 7.4; eation, education and reading, tobacco and alcohol, 7.1.

LABOUR MARKET DECEMBER 1977

sonally adjusted data — nges from November 1977

unemployment rate rose to per cent in December from per cent in November. This ease occurred as the labour e increased slightly but still ater than the increase in loyment.

977, employment increased by 000 (or 1.9 per cent) to 4,000, and the unemployment increased a full percentage nt to 8.1 per cent.

loyment continued to be weak the second consecutive month. er declining in November, loyment increased only ginally during December — as sult, growth in the fourth rter was the weakest of the r. There was an advance in lt employment in the fourth rter but this was largely offset a sharp decline in youth loyment.

ignificant drop in the participa- rate of youths was respon- e for a small decline in the rall participation rate. The adult s, for both sexes, increased htly. The drop in the youth rate ulted in large declines in the our force and in employment; sequently, the unemployment



SOURCE: Statistics Canada, Labour Force Survey.
Statistique Canada, Enquête sur la population.

rate for young people 15-24 years, was unchanged in December at the record high of 15.2 per cent. A strong growth in adult female employment (25,000 or 1.0 per cent) was accompanied by a similar growth in the labour force and so the unemployment rate remained at 7.8 per cent. An increase in the unemployment rate for adult males to 5.0 per cent was due to a faster growth in the labour force than in employment.

Regionally, increases in unemployment rates were recorded in Ontario (7.1 per cent) and Quebec (11.5 per cent) as the level of employment declined in both provinces. The rates remained unchanged in the Prairies (5.1 per cent) and British Columbia (8.5 per cent) as the increases in employment were matched by similar increases in the labour force. In the Atlantic provinces (13.3 per cent) a decline in the unemployment rate was due to a steeper drop in the labour force than in employment.

Employment in the goods-producing sector declined in December as reductions in employment in the agriculture, other primary and construction industries outweighed the strong growth in manufacturing. In the service sector, employment recovered from the loss during November. However, none of the service industries recorded strong growth.

— Annual averages for 1976 and 1977:

	1976			1977		
	'000	Change	%	'000	Change	%
Labour force	10,308	248	2.5	10,616	308	3.0
Employment	9,572	209	2.2	9,754	182	1.9
Unemployment	736	39	5.6	862	126	17.1
Unemployment rate	7.1	0.2	—	8.1	1.0	—
Participation rate	61.1	0.0	—	61.5	0.4	—

Unadjusted data

The actual level of employment was 9,729,000 in December, 2.7 per cent higher than a year ago. The labour force stood at 10,612,000 in December 1977, an increase of 3.7 per cent from December 1976. Thus the actual number of unemployed was 882,000, an increase of 128,000 from a year ago.

The unadjusted unemployment rate was 8.3 per cent in December compared with 7.9 per cent in November and 7.4 per cent in December 1976. The average duration of unemployment was 14.1 weeks in December 1977 compared with 13.3 weeks in December 1976.

JOB VACANCIES — SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER, 1977

The average number of vacant jobs for the three-month period September-November declined 13.8 per cent to 46,200 from 53,600 vacancies reported in the June-August period. Vacancies for full-time jobs decreased by 14 per cent to 39,800 from the preceding period. Vacancies unfilled for more than four weeks declined by 8 per cent to 14,200.

For every 1,000 existing jobs in the latest three-month period, five were vacant, one less than both the preceding period and the same period a year ago. The highest vacancy rates were observed in Alberta (10 per 1,000) with Ontario next (6 per 1,000). The lowest rate (3 per 1,000) occurred in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.

EARNINGS AND INCOME — OCTOBER 1977

Average weekly earnings for the industrial composite increased 0.5 per cent, on a seasonally adjusted basis, between September and October. All industry divisions shared in the increase except forestry, which declined 1.6 per cent after a large increase in the previous month. All regions except the Atlantic region recorded increases over the month.

In manufacturing, the increase in average weekly earnings, seasonally adjusted, was 0.3 per cent to $271.99 in October. Average hourly earnings for the hourly rated wage earners increased 11 cents to $6.55, while average weekly hours increased slightly to 38.7 hours.

On an unadjusted basis, average weekly earnings for the industrial composite increased 9.7 per cent to $257.80 in October from $235.03 a year ago. After adjustments for price changes this increase amounted to 0.5 per cent. Regionally, average weekly earnings in the Atlantic Provinces was $226.26 (year-over-year increase of 9.0 per cent); Quebec $253.61 (10.9 per cent); Ontario $257.38 (9.1 per cent); Prairies $254.34 (9.4 per cent); and British Columbia $291.99 (9.4 per cent).

Total labour income was estimated at $10,351 million for October. The moderate increase of 8.8 per cent from a year ago is explained by large retroactive payments recorded during October 1976. Seasonally adjusted wages and salaries increased by a little over $43 million (or 0.5 per cent) between September and October to $9,334 million.

STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS — OCTOBER 1977

During October there was a significant drop in strike activities. There were 142 work stoppages, 44 fewer than September; 22,307 workers were involved (compared with 32,328 in September), and 243,050 man-days were lost (311,680 in September). The number of man-days lost has been declining gradually from the high of the year recorded in July, and it was the lowest since March 1977.

Man-days lost as a per cent of the estimated working time of all non-agricultural paid workers decreased to 0.14 per cent from 0.17 per cent in September. For the year so far 3.1 million man-days have been lost compared with 10.9 million for the same period in 1976.

The manufacturing sector accounted for more than 60 per cent of the man-days lost in October. There were 154,340 man-days lost compared with 195,950 in September. The ratio of time lost to time worked declined to 0.39 per cent from 0.48 per cent in September.

labour statistics

ABOUR MARKET

	Unadjusted			Seasonally Adjusted				
	Dec. 1976	Dec. 1977	% change[1]	Oct. 1977	Nov. 1977	Dec. 1977	% change[2] Nov.	Dec.
TAL			(numbers in thousands)					
our Force	10,230	10,612	3.7	10,730	10,738	10,753	0.1	0.1
ployment	9,476	9,729	2.7	9,844	9,838	9,842	- 0.1	0.0
employment	754	882	7.0	886	900	911	1.6	1.2
employment Rate (%)	7.4	8.3	—	8.3	8.4	8.5	—	—
ticipation Rate (%)	60.0	60.9	—	61.8	61.8	61.7	—	—
oth Sexes: 15-24	59.9	60.0	—	63.7	63.5	62.8	—	—
Men:	76.1	76.4	—	77.8	77.8	77.8	—	—
— 25 and over	80.4	80.6	—	81.0	80.9	81.1	—	—
Women :	44.4	46.0	—	46.3	46.3	46.3	—	—
— 25 and over	40.7	42.9	—	42.3	42.3	42.7	—	—
PLOYMENT	9,476	9,729	2.7	9,844	9,838	9,842	- 0.1	0.0
oth Sexes: 15-24	2,326	2,325	- 0.0	2,464	2,448	2,422	- 0.6	- 1.1
Men:	5,941	6,025	1.4	6,155	6,147	6,146	- 0.1	- 0.0
— 25 and over	4,690	4,783	2.0	4,810	4,816	4,821	0.1	0.1
Women:	3,535	3,704	4.8	3,689	3,691	3,696	0.1	0.1
— 25 and over	2,461	2,622	6.5	2,570	2,574	2,599	0.2	1.0
d Workers	8,554	8,742	2.2	8,862	8,832	8,814	- 0.3	- 0.2
Non-Agriculture	8,431	8,638	2.5	8,716	8,696	8,687	- 0.2	- 0.1
ndustries								
Agriculture	437	413	- 5.5	483	476	458	- 1.4	- 3.8
Manufacturing	1,915	1,894	- 1.1	1,886	1,889	1,920	0.2	1.6
Construction	617	601	- 2.6	642	656	634	2.2	- 3.4
Trade	1,697	1,745	2.8	1,737	1,702	1,706	- 2.0	0.2
Services	2,606	2,782	6.8	2,749	2,773	2,785	0.9	0.4
Regions								
Atlantic	710	721	1.6	735	740	738	0.7	- 0.3
Quebec	2,441	2,490	2.0	2,508	2,517	2,514	0.4	- 0.1
Ontario	3,664	3,773	3.0	3,831	3,806	3,800	- 0.7	- 0.2
Prairies	1,630	1,685	3.4	1,709	1,704	1,709	- 0.3	0.3
British Columbia	1,030	1,061	3.0	1,067	1,067	1,071	- 0.0	0.4
EMPLOYMENT RATE (%)	7.4	8.3	—	8.3	8.4	8.5	—	—
oth Sexes: 15-24	13.4	14.9	—	14.8	15.2	15.2	—	—
Men:	6.9	7.9	—	7.3	7.5	7.7	—	—
— 25 and over	4.7	5.3	—	4.8	4.8	5.0	—	—
Women :	8.1	9.0	—	9.8	9.8	9.7	—	—
— 25 and over	6.2	7.3	—	7.7	7.8	7.8	—	—
Regions								
Atlantic	11.2	12.9	—	13.5	13.7	13.3	—	—
Quebec	9.4	11.2	—	11.4	11.4	11.5	—	—
Ontario	6.3	6.8	—	6.8	6.8	7.1	—	—
Prairies	4.2	5.1	—	4.8	5.1	5.1	—	—
British Columbia	8.2	8.0	—	8.5	8.5	8.5	—	—

ONSUMER PRICE INDEX

	Unadjusted						Seasonally Adjusted		
	1977			% Change From Previous Year			Current Annual Rate of Change		
	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
l-Items (1971 = 100)	165.0	166.1	167.2	8.8	9.1	9.5	9.5	10.8	11.2
ood "	186.9	188.4	191.5	12.7	13.9	15.4	12.0	17.3	22.7
otal Ex-Food "	157.3	158.3	158.8	7.3	7.4	7.4	8.8	8.5	6.8

EARNINGS AND INCOME

	Unadjusted			Seasonally Adjusted				
	Oct. 1976	Oct. 1977[p]	% change[1]	Aug. 1977[p]	Sept. 1977[p]	Oct. 1977[p]	% change[2] Sept.	Oct.
AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS ($)								
Industrial Composite ($ Current)	235.03	257.80	9.7	252.35	254.56	255.73	0.9	0.5
Real ($ 1971)	154.42	155.21	0.5	154.91	154.28	153.96	- 0.4	- 0.2
By Regions:								
Atlantic	207.61	226.26	9.0	222.49	227.54	225.92	2.3	- 0.7
Quebec	228.74	253.61	10.9	247.91	250.14	251.47	0.9	0.5
Ontario	235.82	257.38	9.1	251.60	254.13	254.88	1.0	0.3
Prairies	232.40	254.34	9.4	250.59	250.87	253.35	0.1	1.0
British Columbia	266.81	291.99	9.4	284.45	285.44	288.87	0.3	1.2
Manufacturing:								
Average Weekly Earnings ($)	248.16	275.09	10.9	268.74	271.25	271.99	0.9	0.3
Average Hourly Earnings ($)	5.92	6.58	11.1	6.43	6.54	6.551.7		0.2
Average Weekly Hours	38.9	39.1	0.5	38.9	38.6	38.7	- 0.8	0.3
Total Labour Income ($ Million)	9,511.2	10,351.0	8.8	10,045.2	10,053.0	10,100.9	0.1	0.5
Wages and Salaries - Total	8,810.3	9,566.9	8.6	9,287.3	9,291.3	9,334.5	0.0	0.5
— Manufacturing	1,933.8	2,145.8	11.8	2,086.9	2,085.2	2,099.4	- 0.1	0.7

JOB VACANCIES

	Unadjusted						Seasonally Adjusted		
	1976		1977			3 Months	1977		
	III	IV	I	II	III	Ending Nov.	I	II	III
	(numbers in thousands)								
All categories	62.3	40.3	39.7	49.7	52.2	46.2	46.8	47.8	42.9
Full-time	54.7	35.8	35.3	43.2	45.4	39.8	41.0	41.5	37.4
Part-time	20.3	13.9	12.4	13.2	15.9	14.2	13.7	14.4	12.5

STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS

	1976				1977				
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	Sept.	Oct.
Strikes and Lockouts	172	209	203	143	119	159	177	186	142
No. of Workers Involved	125,271	231,695	112,173	342,621	23,948	34,555	36,706	32,328	22,307
Man-days Lost — Total	610,433	864,817	1,466,900	927,813	215,677	346,553	394,273	311,680	243,050
— Manufacturing	421,673	296,383	501,157	278,540	110,100	207,630	189,653	194,950	154,340
Man-days Lost as a % of Estimated Working Time	0.35	0.48	0.79	0.50	0.12	0.19	0.21	0.17	0.14
— Manufacturing	1.08	0.74	1.18	0.67	0.28	0.52	0.46	0.48	0.39

[1]Per cent change from previous year.
[2]Per cent change from previous month.

Source: Statistics Canada, The Labour Force, Cat. No. 71-001.

NIMUM WAGE RATES — PER HOUR

diction	Effective Date	Experienced Adults	Youths and Students
ral	April 1, 1976	$2.90	under 17: $2.65
rta	March 1, 1977	$3.00	under 18: $2.85 Part-time students under 18: $2.50
sh Columbia	June 1, 1976	$3.00	17 and under $2.60
toba	September 1, 1976	$2.95	under 18: $2.70
Brunswick	November 1, 1976	$2.80	no special rates
foundland	January 1, 1976	$2.50	no special rates
a Scotia	January 1, 1977	$2.75	14 to 18: $2.50
rio	March 15, 1976	$2.65	Students under 18 employed less than 28 hours in a week or during a school holiday: $2.15
ce Edward Island	July 1, 1977 July 1, 1978	$2.70 $2.75	under 18: $2.40 under 18: $2.40
bec	January 1, 1978	$3.27	under 18: $3.07
katchewan	January 31, 1978 June 30, 1978	$3.15 $3.25	no special rates no special rates
hwest Territories	June 7, 1976	$3.00	under 17: $2.55
on Territory	April 1, 1976	$3.00	no special rates


UNEMPLOYMENT RATES
(SEASONALLY ADJUSTED)
TAUX DE CHOMAGE
(DESAISONNALISES)
1973 — 1977
%
CANADA AND REGIONS
CANADA ET REGIONS
ATLANTIC
ATLANTIQUE
QUEBEC
QUEBEC
COLOMBIE-BRITANNIQUE
BRITISH COLUMBIA
CANADA
ONTARIO
PRAIRIES
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977

STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS

Statistical information on work stoppages in Canada is compiled by the Labour Data Branch of the Canada Department of Labour on the basis of reports from the Canada Manpower Division, Department of Manpower and Immigration. The tables cover strikes and lockouts that amount to 10 or more man-days. The number of workers involved includes all workers reported on strike or lockout, whether or not they all belonged to the union directly involved in the disputes leading to the work stoppages. Workers indirectly affected, such as those laid off as a result of a work stoppage, are not included.

TIME PERSPECTIVE ON WORK STOPPAGES, NOVEMBER 1977

Period	Number beginning during month	Work stoppages in existence during month or year			Per cent of estimated working time
		Number	Workers involved	Duration in man-days	
Year					
1973	677	724	348,470	5,776,080	0.30
1974	1,173	1,218	580,912	9,221,890	0.46
1975	1,103	1,171	506,443	10,908,810	0.53
1976	921	1,039	1,570,940	11,609,890	0.55
1976					
November	52	138	54,886	498,700	0.26
December	37	110	45,090	249,020	0.13
1977*					
January	47	113	29,132	227,670	0.13
February	45	111	19,272	193,140	0.12
March	69	133	23,441	226,220	0.12
April	76	160	39,133	353,400	0.21
May	60	154	32,857	359,740	0.20
June	59	162	31,675	326,520	0.19
July	51	169	40,805	466,650	0.26
August	68	175	36,984	404,490	0.20
September	65	186	32,328	311,680	0.17
October	42	142	22,307	243,050	0.14
November	37	127	32,870	317,190	0.17
January-November 1977*		685		3,429,760	0.17
January-November 1976		1,002		11,361,070	0.57

*Preliminary

WORK STOPPAGES BY INDUSTRY, NOVEMBER 1977 (Preliminary)

Industry	Number beginning during month	Work stoppages in existence during month			Cumulative duration in man-days (Jan. to Nov.)
		Number	Workers involved	Duration in man-days	
Agriculture	0	0	0	0	0
Forestry	0	0	0	0	63,810
Fishing	0	0	0	0	20,800
Mines	0	2	180	3,960	119,710
Manufacturing	15	53	9,498	141,890	1,819,990
Construction	5	8	1,862	7,190	429,080
Transp. & Utilities	4	17	12,684	99,500	292,810
Trade	1	14	529	11,150	153,410
Finance	0	1	8	180	11,010
Service	9	23	7,123	40,680	362,250
Public Admin.	3	9	986	12,640	156,890
Various industries	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	37	127	32,870	317,190	3,429,760

WORK STOPPAGES BY JURISDICTION, NOVEMBER, 1977 (Preliminary)

Jurisdiction	Number beginning during month	Work stoppages in existence during month			Cumulative duration in man-days (Jan. to Nov.)
		Number	Workers involved	Duration in man-days	
Nfld	1	2	1,403	1,160	129,350
P.E.I.	0	0	0	0	t
N.S.	1	3	97	1,180	21,030
N.B.	2	3	504	2,300	38,430
Québec	13	69	14,353	187,120	1,600,360
Ontario	13	30	4,714	34,020	1,079,410
Manitoba	2	2	507	1,140	28,350
Saskatchewan	3	5	129	1,740	33,660
Alberta	0	3	295	6,440	86,210
B.C.	2	5	670	5,050	144,580
Yukon & N.W.T.	0	0	0	0	
Total, provinces	37	122	22,672	240,050	3,161,300
Federal Public Service(1)	0	0	0	0	12,860
Federal Industries(2)	0	5	10,198	77,140	255,520
Federal total	0	5	10,198	77,140	268,380
TOTAL	37	127	32,870	317,190	3,429,760

(1) Covered under the Public Service Staff Relations Act.
(2) Covered under the Canada Labour Code: Part V.

NOTE: Numbers relate only to workers directly involved in the dispute.